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1 
Origins of the Privileges and Immunities 
of State Citizenship under Article IV 
Stewart Jay* 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV provides: “The 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States.”  According to Alexander Hamilton, the 
clause was “the basis of the union,” which may seem odd given its minor 
significance in modern constitutional law.  Part of the reason for its 
relative unimportance today is the development of constitutional doctrines 
unforeseeable in the eighteenth century: the invention of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
prohibit much of the interstate discrimination that Article IV’s clause was 
intended to prevent.  However, a major explanation for the unseemly fate of 
the clause lies with early judges who were not faithful to its original 
purpose.  Courts and scholars have perpetuated their errors. 
The clause had one overriding purpose: to assure that Americans were 
not treated as aliens when in states away from their place of citizenship.  It 
was intended to preserve the benefits that Americans had as British 
subjects of being afforded the same rights as local residents anywhere in 
the country.  The advantages of citizenship (or being a subject) were many, 
ranging from the protection of life, limb, and property, to commercial 
advantages and access to public resources.  The multifarious meanings of 
“privileges” and “immunities” in eighteenth-century writings show that 
they encompassed every kind of advantage that came from citizenship.  
This is why Hamilton could claim the clause was “the basis of the union.” 
There is compelling reason to conclude that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause was intended to guarantee Americans traveling or 
temporarily residing in another state, or doing business or owning 
property outside their home states, that they would be treated exactly like 
the local people, without exception, and regardless of whether the right 
was recognized by other states, including their own.  No court or scholar 
 
* Professor of Law and Pendleton Miller Chair in Law, University of Washington School of 
Law.  © Stewart Jay 2013.  All spellings and grammatical uses in quoted early documents have 
been left in their original form without a “sic” to indicate a departure from modern use, except for 
apparent typographical errors. 
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has ever reached this conclusion, but it is amply supported by the evidence 
presented here. 
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INTRODUCTION: “THE BASIS OF THE UNION” 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 80 that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV was “the basis of the union.”1  
Unfortunately, he did not elaborate, and almost no one else mentioned it at 
the Constitutional Convention or during ratification, which at least 
indicates that the provision was not controversial.  Courts would later hold 
that the clause guaranteed Americans the right to move about the country at 
 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 537 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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will, buy property in all states, transact business in any place free of 
discriminatory taxes and regulations, use the courts everywhere, be 
protected by the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other rights, all on the 
same terms a state would afford its own citizens.2  In that sense, it has 
served as a kind of equal protection provision for outsiders, requiring that 
state governments treat them much the same as their own citizens.  For this 
reason as well, courts sometimes refer to it as “the comity article of the 
Constitution.”3 
A student of constitutional law today, however, would be forgiven for 
being puzzled by Hamilton’s remark.  At best, a typical course casebook 
might devote a few pages to the clause, hardly what one would expect for 
the foundation of the nation.  Part of the reason is that the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and section one of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid 
many of the types of discriminatory legislation that are covered by it.4  As a 
leading casebook explains, “the modern function” of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause “appears to be that of carving out an exception to the 
market-participant exception to the commerce clause.”5  This is not the fate 
one would anticipate from “the basis of the union”—an exception to a 
constitutional rule that was not discussed by the framers and ratifiers of the 
Constitution, and that no authority anticipated. 
Aside from the emergence of doctrines that could not have been 
predicted at the founding, there is another explanation for why the clause 
has receded in importance.  Early judicial interpretations of the clause were 
almost certainly wrong in depicting the limited scope of the rights it was 
intended to protect.  In those cases, courts struggled with the word “all” in 
the clause.  Judges somehow could not believe that it literally encompassed 
 
2. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (listing 
rights protected by Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
3. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975), quoted in Zobel v. Williams, 457 
U.S. 55, 80 n.10 (1982); see also Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 419 n.2 (1952) (referring 
to the “comity clause”). 
4. See Baldwin v. Mont. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978) (“Historically, it 
has been overshadowed by the appearance in 1868 of similar language in section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).  On the overlap of the dormant Commerce Clause’s ban on 
protectionist economic legislation and the Privilege and Immunities Clause, see United Haulers 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343 (2007) (applying 
“rigorous scrutiny” under the dormant Commerce Clause when a law favors in-state commerce 
over out-of-state commerce); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) 
(“The paradigmatic example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective 
tariff or customs duty . . . .”).  On the overlap with the Equal Protection Clause, see Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985) (“Alabama’s aim to promote domestic industry[,] . . . 
designed only to favor domestic industry within the State, . . . constitutes the very sort of 
parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent.”). 
5. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 256 (6th ed. 2009).  This text devotes 
less than two pages to Article IV, Section 2, clause 1.  See id. at 255–56. 
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every one of the rights of citizens.  And their holdings reflect that belief, as 
they rely on formulaic reasoning without any regard for historical usage or 
context.6 
In the leading case of this period interpreting the clause, the 1823 circuit 
court decision Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Bushrod Washington asserted 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not encompass all the rights 
and benefits that a state bestowed on its citizens.  Rather, those protected 
were ones “which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; 
and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several 
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, 
independent, and sovereign.”7  Even though Corfield was not a Supreme 
Court case, with one major exception the decision had permanent 
consequences, especially in the nineteenth century.8  The Court still honors 
Washington’s conclusion that the clause only protects “fundamental 
rights,” those “basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union.”9 
These pages reconstruct the record in depth, by examining not only the 
drafting and ratifying history of the clause, but the deeper context offered 
by the political history, literature, and legal principles of the period.  This 
study has been made possible by searchable databases unknown to prior 
generations.  By searching thousands of published works in English from 
the eighteenth century and earlier, the meaning of the term “privileges and 
immunities” emerges with great clarity. 
There is compelling reason to conclude that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause was intended to do precisely what Justice Washington 
denied—guarantee to Americans traveling or temporarily residing in 
 
6. See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1714–16 (2013) (relying on case 
precedents alone to interpret the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
7. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. 
8. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 385 (“[Corfield’s] holding, and the conception of state 
sovereignty upon which it relied, formed the basis for similar decisions during later years of the 
19th century.”).  In 1948, the Court overruled Corfield’s conclusion “that although the States 
were obligated to treat all those within their territory equally in most respects, they were not 
obliged to share those things they held in trust for their own people,” such as a natural resource.  
Id.  In Toomer v. Witsell, the Court concluded that “the whole ownership theory” was “a fiction,” 
in the sense of being merely “legal shorthand [for] the importance to its people that a State have 
power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.”  334 U.S. 385, 402 
(1948).  This was the correct conclusion, but not for the reason stated in Toomer.  As shown 
herein, access to natural resources was a privilege of citizenship, see infra text accompanying 
notes 145–59, and hence a state would be obliged to extend access to all Americans on the same 
terms. 
9. McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388).  McBurney, which held 
that access to state information via a Freedom of Information Act law was not a fundamental 
privilege and immunity, is the latest example of reliance on Corfield’s summary.  Id. at 1714, 
1716, 1718; see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–02 & n.14 (1999) (discussing rights 
protected by Privileges and Immunities Clause and citing Corfield for support). 
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another state, or doing business or owning property outside their home 
states, that they would be treated exactly like the local people, without 
exception, and regardless of whether the right was recognized by other 
states, including their own.  No court or scholar has ever reached this 
conclusion, but it is amply supported by the evidence presented here. 
This study begins with an exploration of origins of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause during the period of the Articles of Confederation,10 and 
then in the creation and ratification of the Constitution.11  Next, it considers 
the meaning of “privileges” and “immunities” as legal guarantees in the 
eighteenth century, including their relation to political liberties and natural 
rights.12  The conclusion will be that both the British and Americans 
understood these terms as encompassing all the rights a state afforded its 
citizens. 
I. ORIGINS AND PURPOSE 
OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
The clause reads in full: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”13  It was 
worded to be self-enforcing, neither requiring nor authorizing legislation 
for implementation.  Unlike the Full Faith and Credit Clause,14 Congress 
was not expressly empowered to enact laws for the purpose of enforcing 
the guarantee.  By default, its implementation depended on the judiciary.  
The only recorded effort at the Convention to involve Congress in the 
application of the clause was a proposal—more a suggestion—by Edmund 
Randolph that each state have an equal vote in the Senate for “regulating 
the rights to be enjoyed by citizens of one State in the other States.”15  
 
10. See infra Part I.A (discussing how trade disputes between states under the Articles of 
Confederation precipitated the need to include the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the 
Constitution). 
11. See infra Part I.B (discussing how the Privileges and Immunities Clause came into exist-
ence and the extent of the rights it was meant to grant).  
12. See infra Part II (discussing the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause viewed 
through the perspective of what its creators and their contemporaries would have understood it to 
mean). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
14. Id. at art. IV, § 1 (providing that Congress can enact “general Laws” to facilitate the 
recognition by states of the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State”). 
15. Edmund Randolph, Suggestion for Conciliating the Small States (July 10, 1787), in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 55 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 3 
CONST. CONV.].  In THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), Madison alluded to the possibility 
of legislation related to the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  He noted that under a similar 
provision in the Articles of Confederation, states could be obliged to extend “the rights of 
citizenship” and “the privilege of residence” to “aliens who had rendered themselves noxious.”  
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 1, at 286 (James Madison).  He then claimed that the new 
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Randolph’s proposal, which was designed to placate the small states, 
became moot after the delegates agreed on the Great Compromise. 
According to Charles Pinckney, who introduced the clause at the 
Convention, it was “formed exactly upon the principles” of a similar 
provision in the Articles of Confederation.16  The purpose of the provision 
in the Articles was stated in the preamble to the clause: “The better to 
secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people 
of the different States in this Union.”17  The part most like the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause was Article IV, which provided: 
[T]he free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and 
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and 
immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of 
each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other 
State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and 
commerce.18 
Protecting nonresident visitors or temporary inhabitants in a state from 
discrimination was a very old practice, especially as applied to merchants.  
William Blackstone noted that under Magna Carta “all merchants (unless 
publickly prohibited beforehand) shall have safe conduct to depart from, to 
come into, to tarry in, and to go through England, for the exercise of 
merchandize, without any unreasonable imposts, except in time of war,” 
 
Constitution corrected this “defect of the confederation . . . by authorising the general government 
to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States.”  Id. at 286–87; see 
also WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 85 
(Phila., Philip H. Nicklin 2d ed., 1829) (agreeing that the “evil” of state-specific power of 
naturalization “could not be better remedied than by vesting the exclusive power in congress”).  
More recently, it has been argued that the clause was meant to empower Congress “to protect 
American citizens in their privileges and immunities of citizenship, i.e., their natural, fundamental 
rights, against invasions by either states or individuals.”  Chester James Antieau, Paul’s 
Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1967).  Like Madison and Rawle, Antieau offered no 
historical evidence for this conclusion, and it has never been judicially recognized.  The 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was placed in Article IV, Section 2, a section imposing 
obligations on states, not under the powers of Congress in Article I.  The Naturalization Clause, 
art. I, § 8, cl. 4, is the basis for Congress “establish[ing] an uniform rule of naturalization,” but it 
has never been interpreted by courts as creating national legislative power over the rights of state 
citizenship or the obligation of states under Article IV. 
16. Charles Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal 
Convention in Philadelphia (c. Oct. 1787), in 3 CONST. CONV., supra note 15, at 112. 
17. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV.  Pinckney made the same point about the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Extradition Clause.  See Pinckney, supra note 16, at 112. 
18. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1.  On the drafting history of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, see generally DAVID S. BOGEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: 
A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 11–21 (2003) [hereinafter BOGEN, 
PRIVILEGES]; David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 794, 817–40 (1987) [hereinafter Bogen, CASE]; Robert G. Natelson, The Original 
Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117, 1176–83 (2009). 
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and even then merchants from the belligerent nation were to be as “secure” 
as English traders were in the belligerent’s country.19  It was “somewhat 
extraordinary,” he allowed, that foreign merchants were safeguarded by “a 
mere insular treaty between the king and his natural-born subjects; this 
remark occasioned the learned Montesquieu to write with a degree of 
admiration, ‘that the English have made the protection of foreign 
merchants one of the articles of their national liberty.’”20  Blackstone 
cleverly coupled that quote with another from Montesquieu, in which the 
French political theorist observed of the British that they knew “better than 
any other people upon earth, how to value at the same time these three 
great advantages, religion, liberty, and commerce.”21 
Eighteenth-century Americans were no different than the British in 
welcoming outside traders and investors.  The colonies, and later the states, 
protected visitors in varying ways—at least on paper.  In 1641, for 
example, the Massachusetts colony enacted a code of liberties, providing: 
“Every person within this Jurisdiction, whether Inhabitant or forreiner shall 
enjoy the same justice and law, that is generall for the plantation, . . . 
without partialitie or delay.”22  As British subjects in the eighteenth 
century, the American colonists had been entitled to move about the 
kingdom, establish a residence in England or another colony, trade without 
discrimination, and own property anywhere in the realm, subject to 
restrictions applicable to all subjects.23  Poor laws, for example, could 
 
19. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *252 (Oxford, 1765). 
20. Id. (quoting 2 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. 20, ch. 13, at 10 (G. & A. 
Ewing & G. Faulkner eds., Dublin 1751)). 
21. Id. at *253 (quoting 2 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 20, at bk. 20, ch. 6, at 6). 
22. THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETS COLLONIE IN NEW ENGLAND (1641), 
reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 428, 428 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987).   
23. See infra text accompanying notes 177–80, 212–15; see also Douglass’ Adm’r v. Stevens, 2 
Del. Cas. 489, 502 (1819) (“Before the Declaration of Independence, the colonists of Great Britain in 
America, and before and since, the subjects of the King of England in every part of the world, could, 
and can, acquire, inherit, and hold land in any of his dominions, as fully as an Englishman can in 
England.”); Bogen, CASE, supra note 18, at 817 (“As British subjects, colonists had rights to travel, 
to become members of another colony by moving there, and to be free of discrimination in trade, 
property ownership and other legal rights in other colonies.”); id. at 811 (“Immigration from 
England and intercolonial migration occurred throughout the colonial period.  The common allegiance 
to the King meant that the colonist could travel to England or other colonies as freely as the English 
subject who lived in England.  The right to travel was an established English liberty since the Magna 
Carta.”); id. at 861 (“Colonial inhabitants were all originally the King’s subjects, and no colony treated 
the inhabitants of other colonies as aliens.”).  On colonists’ rights as British subjects, see generally 
BOGEN, PRIVILEGES, supra note 18, at 1–6; Bogen, CASE, supra note 18, at 796–817.  The right to 
migrate could be restricted in some places on religious grounds, to protect creditors, or to exclude 
paupers; mercantile regulations prohibited some inter-colonial trade, but these limits applied to 
everyone.  See Bogen, CASE, supra note 18, at 811.  Non-British residents of colonies could also 
be treated less favorably than Britons.  See infra text accompanying notes 169–76. 
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prevent indigents from relocating, which was the practice well into the 
nineteenth century.24  The Articles specifically relieved states of any 
obligation to extend rights of citizenship to “paupers, vagabonds and 
fugitives from justice.”  Article IV, by contrast, granted to every state 
citizen “all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”25  
This did not necessarily mean that the clause required states to admit every 
American to residency or citizenship, as poor laws attested.  After studying 
in more detail the rights of citizenship in early America, it will be evident 
that the clause did not prevent states from treating nonresidents—whether 
citizens of the state or not—differently from resident citizens in important 
ways, such as eligibility to vote and hold public office.26 
The proximate reason why the Framers included the clause among the 
obligations of states under the Constitution was their serious alarm over 
deteriorating interstate trade relations.  It was one of several measures they 
adopted to prevent discrimination by states in taxing and regulating 
interstate and international commerce.  However, this was only the 
immediate concern.  The larger purpose of the clause was to assure that 
Americans continued to enjoy what had been an important aspect of being 
a British subject, the right to live, work, and own property throughout the 
country without being treated as aliens.  The clause meant nothing less than 
a guarantee that these advantages would not be lost even though the 
Revolution had formally left the states as separate sovereigns with the 
power to exclude anyone they wished.  It was for this reason that Hamilton 
could think that the clause was “the basis of the union.”27 
 
24. See John Cummings, Poor-Laws of Massachusetts and New York: With Appendices 
Containing the United States Immigration and Contract-Labor Laws: Preface, 104 PUB. AM. 
ECON. ASS’N 481, 487 (1895) (“Much of the poor-relief legislation in the United States has taken 
the form of restriction put upon the migration of paupers.  The earlier settlement laws are attempts 
to regulate the migration of paupers from village to village; the later settlement laws, attempts to 
regulate interstate migration.”); see also Lawrence F. Ebb, Interstate Barriers in India and 
American Constitutional Experience, 11 STAN. L. REV. 37, 88 (1958) (“The colonial governments 
in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America, following the Elizabethan poor law concepts, 
rated paupers with convicts and imbeciles as wards of a particular community to which they 
‘rightfully’ belonged—their place of ‘settlement.’  Before the Constitution was adopted, the 
American States exercised the power of forcibly moving poor citizens within the state to the 
district of their settlement.”). 
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
26. See infra text accompanying notes 193–94, 284–87 (describing various states and the 
privileges and immunities that their residents possessed as compared to their nonresidents); see 
also infra notes 277, 284–87 (discussing ways states could treat nonresidents less favorably than 
their own citizens). 
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 537 (Alexander Hamilton); see Saenz v. Roe, 
526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (“The right of ‘free ingress and regress to and from’ neighboring States, 
which was expressly mentioned in the text of the Articles of Confederation, may simply have 
been ‘conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the 
Constitution created.’” (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)).  
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A. The Problem of Interstate Trade Discrimination 
During the Confederation 
With the conclusion of the Revolution, relations among the states 
deteriorated rapidly as the revolutionary esprit de corps dissipated.  
Boundary disputes, discriminatory trade legislation, and refusals of state 
courts to honor debt claims by citizens of other states became common 
occurrences, ultimately traceable to what Edmund Randolph termed “the 
jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.”28  Hamilton 
complained at the Philadelphia Convention that the states “constantly 
pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole.”29  By referring to 
“the whole,” Hamilton meant the thirteen states as a collective entity—a 
nation.  In his view, the United States had a national public interest, one 
that stood distinct from the partial concerns of states or individuals.  
Madison had a parallel outlook, as he observed that “[e]xperience had 
evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal 
authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of 
each other; to oppress the weaker party within their respective 
jurisdictions.”30 
Trade declined sharply during the Revolution and remained feeble in the 
1780s, owing in significant part to the British exclusion of American trade 
with the West Indies.  Exports plummeted.  Nevertheless, Americans 
imported large quantities of manufactured goods in the early 1780s, in part 
to replace what had been destroyed or depleted in the war.  Despite 
lingering antagonism toward their erstwhile mother country, Americans 
still preferred British manufactured products, and by mid-decade they were 
running a sizeable balance of payment deficit with Britain.  Much of the 
deficit was financed by overseas debt, which had to be repaid in specie, not 
paper money.  This in turn “acted like a magnet to draw gold and silver 
from America to Britain.”31  The consequence was that America’s “long-
 
28. Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Federal Convention of 1787 (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 17, 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 
1 CONST. CONV.].  Randolph was hardly alone in his assessment of the states.  Elbridge Gerry, 
one of the strongest advocates for states’ rights at the Convention, exclaimed: “The States & the 
advocates for them were intoxicated with the idea of their sovereignty.”  Id. at 467 (June 29, 
1787).  This problem—most of the Framers saw it as such—was inherent in confederations like 
the Articles.  “A confederacy supposes sovereignty in the members composing it & sovereignty 
supposes equality,” Roger Sherman noted for the benefit of other delegates.  Id. at 178 (June 9, 
1787).  John Lansing, who departed the Convention midstream because he thought the 
Constitution as it stood when he left was dangerous to the independence of the states, chided the 
delegates: “It could not be expected that those possessing Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part 
with it.”  Id. at 336–37 (June 20, 1787). 
29. Id. at 284 (Alexander Hamilton, June 18, 1787). 
30. Id. at 164 (Alexander Hamilton, June 8, 1787). 
31. CURTIS P. NETTELS, THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL ECONOMY, 1775–1815, at 49 (1962). 
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term credit had been stretched to the breaking point by late 1785,” as more 
and more buyers of imports “proved unable to pay dry goods importers 
their debts.”32  By then, the economy was in the midst of a commercial 
depression.33  James Wilson observed in 1785: 
The disagreeable state of our commerce has been the effect of 
extravagant and injudicious importation. . . . What was the 
consequence?  Those who made any payments made them chiefly in 
specie; and in that way diminished our circulation.  Others made no 
remittances at all, and thereby injured our credit.34 
During the Confederation, Congress had no authority to regulate or tax 
foreign trade, and States pursued their own policies, which included tariffs 
on imports and exports, tonnage duties on trading vessels, bans or high 
duties on British imports and vessels, and embargoes of domestic products, 
among others.35  States had many legitimate reasons for enacting trade 
policies, not the least of which was to raise badly needed revenue from 
customs duties and tonnage charges.36  Protective tariffs and embargoes on 
 
32. Cathy Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, in 1 THE 
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA 363, 380 
(Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1996). 
33. The state of the American economy in the 1780s has long been disputed by historians.  
There is general agreement that commercial sectors were in depression by the mid-1780s.  See 
MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 
CONFEDERATION 1781–1789, at 187 (1950) (“By the spring of 1784, the glutted market, the 
scarcity of specie, and the overextension of credit all combined to produce a serious commercial 
depression . . . .”); JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH 
AMERICA, 1607–1789, at 373 (1985) (“[I]f the results of current research stand future scrutiny, 
something ‘truly disastrous’ happened to the American economy between 1775 and 1790.”).  
Merrill Jensen, however, concluded that “the period was one of extraordinary economic 
growth. . . . [T]here is no evidence of stagnation and decay in the 1780’s.”  JENSEN, supra, at 
423–24.  Jensen’s point was that Americans should not have been pessimistic given the 
economy’s upward direction and the country’s immense resources.  He also noted that farmers 
who did not grow for export “were self-sufficing to a large extent.”  Id. at 177.  Most Americans 
lived subsistence lives.  See James F. Shepherd, British America and the Atlantic Colonies, in 
THE ECONOMY OF EARLY AMERICA: THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 1763–1790, at 3, 38 (Ronald 
Hoffman et al. eds., 1988).  Nonetheless, ordinary Americans in the 1780s experienced sharply 
lower incomes than before the war.  See infra note 57. 
34. James Wilson, Considerations on the Bank of North America (1785), reprinted in 2 THE 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 824, 838 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).  On trading patterns 
after the Revolution, see NETTELS, supra note 31, at 45–63.  Great Britain closed its ports in the 
West Indies to Americans in 1783, ending a trade “absolutely essential to pay for English 
manufactures.”  ALBERT ANTHONY GIESECKE, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE 
1789, at 127 (1910).  On the relationship between the trade deficit and indebtedness, see 
Shepherd, supra note 33, at 17.  On the decline in trade during and after the Revolution, see id. at 
19–32. 
35. See Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce 
Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 266 (2005) (“Lacking regulatory authority over commerce, Congress 
was powerless to strike back with a unified trade policy.”). 
36. See Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce 
and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 45 (2005–2006) 
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imports were justified as means to promote local manufacturing and 
agriculture, retain scarce resources, and keep money from leaving the 
state.37  Tonnage fees, assessed on the weight of merchant vessels, paid for 
lighthouses and other navigation aids.38  Measures that discriminated 
against British trade were taken in retaliation against its restrictive policies 
toward American commerce.39  None of these efforts were coordinated, 
however, and policies varied from place to place.  They also fluctuated 
unexpectedly, to the consternation of merchants and planters, who 
preferred stable regulations.  In a recurring scenario, provisions imposed by 
one state, such as tariffs, would be exploited by others.  Hugh Williamson, 
a North Carolina delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, wrote that if one 
state tried “to raise a little money by imports or other commercial 
regulations . . . [a] neighbouring state immediately alters her laws, and 
defeats the revenue by throwing the trade into a different channel.  Instead 
of supporting or assisting, we are uniformly taking the advantage of one 
another.”40  Writing to Jefferson in 1786, Madison bemoaned this situation: 
The States are every day giving proofs that separate regulations are 
more likely to set them by the ears, than to attain the common object.  
When Massts. set on foot a retaliation of the policy of G. B.[,] 
Connecticut declared her ports free.  N. Jersey served N. York in the 
same way.  And Delaware I am told has lately followed the example in 
opposition to the commercial plans of Penna.41 
Even when state trade policies were adopted for the good reasons, the 
benefits gained by the enacting states usually came at the expense of 
 
(noting functions of tonnage charges, including raising needed revenue).  
37. Id. (noting legitimate justifications for duties and tonnage charges). 
38. See Adam S. Grace, From the Lighthouses: How the First Federal Internal Improvement 
Projects Created Precedent That Broadened the Commerce Clause, Shrunk the Takings Clause, 
and Affected Early Nineteenth Century Constitutional Debate, 68 ALB. L. REV. 97, 102 (2004) 
(stating that tonnage duties were “relied upon by states for the maintenance of their lighthouses”); 
see also, e.g., Virginia Act of Oct., 1786, Ch. XXIX, at 21 (tonnage duties dedicated to 
maintaining lighthouse). 
39. On the types of state trade policies and their rationales, see generally GIESECKE, supra 
note 34, at 123–40; Matson, supra note 32, at 379–81.  On discrimination against British trade, 
see NETTELS, supra note 31, at 72; Denning, supra note 36, at 45–48; id. at 46 (“During this 
period, according to one count, six states passed imposts, nine states discriminated against British 
goods, seven states imposed duties on British ship entrances and British commodities, and three 
states forbade export of American goods in British ships.” (citing Matson, supra note 32, at 379)). 
40. Hugh Williamson, Remarks on the New Plan of Government, ST. GAZETTE N.C., 1788, 
reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS 
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787–1788, at 397, 393, 403 (Paul L. Ford ed., Brooklyn, Historical 
Printing Club 1892) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION]. 
41. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), reprinted in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 500, 502 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) [hereinafter MADISON 
PAPERS].  On states taking advantage of trade restrictions by other states, see NETTELS, supra 
note 31, at 73. 
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Americans beyond their borders.  States with naturally superior ports 
played their geographical upper hands to the detriment of states without 
direct sea links.  Massachusetts and New York, for example, raised large 
sums by imposts on imports, which in turn were passed on to customers in 
states such as New Jersey and Connecticut.42  Oliver Ellsworth put the 
point provocatively at the Connecticut ratifying convention when he stated 
that “we pay a tribute” to Massachusetts.43  He further estimated that one-
third of New York’s revenue from imposts came from goods consumed in 
Connecticut.44  Madison wrote to Jefferson in 1783, stating that the duties 
Pennsylvania and Maryland were imposing on Virginia trade amounted to 
“a tribute which if paid into the treasury of State would yield a surplus 
above all its wants.”45 
Retaliation was sometimes the consequence of such policies, as occurred 
in 1787 when New York increased duties on foreign goods brought to New 
York from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and 
raised port fees for coastal shipping.  This action was taken in response to 
the pursuit of free trade policies by these other states that undercut New 
York’s tariffs.  New Jersey retaliated by imposing a large tax on a 
lighthouse operated on its coast by New York.  Connecticut imposed a fee 
on coastal ships under twenty tons “bound either to the State of New-York 
or Rhode-Island.”46 
Some of the trade measures enacted by states amounted to “overt 
discrimination by one state against goods produced in or re-exported from 
a neighboring state.”47  Maryland, for example, imposed import and export 
 
42. See Matson, supra note 32, at 380 (“States with major port cities, especially New York 
and Massachusetts, took advantage of their superior position in international commerce and in 
regional markets to pass discriminatory duties against neighboring states’ traffic at their ports, 
while weaker states tried to divert trade to themselves by abolishing duties altogether, thus setting 
parameters for intense interstate rivalries by mid-1785.”). 
43. Oliver Ellsworth, Remarks at the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), in 2 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 185, 189 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
44. Id. (one-third estimate). 
45. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1783), reprinted in 7 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 401, 401 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).   
46. An Act in Alteration of an Act, entitled, An Act for Regulating Fees, etc., reprinted in 
CONNECTICUT ACTS 356 (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1787).  On the New York acts and 
subsequent retaliation, see E. WILDER SPAULDING, NEW YORK IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD, 1783–
1789, at 156–57 (1932); id. at 156 (“New York in 1785 not only took her toll from imports 
passing through to her neighbor states, but taxed foreign articles which reached her after 
importation in foreign ships through neighboring ports.”). 
47. Denning, supra note 36, at 48.  On trade discrimination by states during the 
Confederation, see id. at 39 (arguing that the concern over interstate “discrimination was not the 
product of the fevered imagination of nationalists bent on reining in the states, but that it really 
existed, and that it showed no signs of abating on the eve of the Philadelphia Convention”); 
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duties on various commodities, but allowed substantial deductions for 
goods carried on vessels built in Maryland that were owned or navigated by 
its citizens (ostensibly, this was to encourage ship building in the state).48  
Similarly, Virginia levied tonnage charges and other duties on all vessels 
entering or leaving the state’s ports, but exempted those owned by its 
citizens.49 
The actual extent of the trade barriers that resulted from this interstate 
competition has long been a subject of debate among historians.  Writing in 
the late nineteenth century, John Fiske concluded that “the different states, 
with their different tariff and tonnage acts, began to make commercial war 
upon one another.”50  Revisionist historians subsequently took exception to 
this thesis, none more aggressively so than Merrill Jensen, who contended 
in an influential work that barriers to trade “were the exception rather than 
the rule.”51  Jensen and others made much of the fact that “[t]he general 
rule was that all American goods were exempted from state imposts.”52  
 
Matson, supra note 32, at 379–81 (describing discriminatory policies and their effects); see also 
GIESECKE, supra note 34, at 126–27 (“Although the reason for most of these acts was revenue, 
motives of discrimination and protection were prominent in those of the northern states, and to a 
less extent in the southern states.”); id. at 125–40 (providing examples of discriminatory laws); 
RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781–1789, at 148–49 (1987); Albert S. 
Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 
25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 448 (1941) (“[T]he states were using their imposts as weapons against 
each other . . . .”). 
48. See An Act To Impose Duties on Certain Enumerated Articles Imported Exported Into and 
Exported Out of this State, and on All Other Goods, Wares and Merchandise, Imported into this 
State, ch. 84, § 16, reprinted in 1784 LAWS OF MARYLAND 442 (Alexander Hanson ed., 
Annapolis, Frederick Green 1787) (example of deductions from import duties for Maryland 
citizens); An Act to Amend the Act for Ascertaining Certain Taxes and Duties, and for 
Establishing a Permanent Revenue, ch. 79, § 19, reprinted in 1782 VIRGINIA ACTS 25 (John 
Dunlap & James Hayes 1781) (amending the revenue act to clarify that “all vessels coming within 
this State from any of the United States, or from any port or place whatever, vessels of war 
excepted, shall be liable to pay the tonnage and other duties”).  
49. See An Act to Amend the Act of Amend and Reduce the Several Acts of Assembly for 
Ascertaining Certain Taxes and Duties . . . , ch. 38, § 3, reprinted in 1783 VIRGINIA ACTS, supra 
note 48, at 206 (exempting from tonnage all ships owned by Virginia citizens as well as vessels 
owned by Maryland citizens under sixty tons). 
50. JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 1783–1789, at 144–45 
(Boston, New York, Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1888).  Fiske’s view is now generally regarded by 
economic historians as an exaggeration of the actual degree of trade disputes among the states.  
See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 333 (1979).  That does not deny, however, that leading proponents 
of the Constitution regarded the problem as urgently needing reform. 
51. Jensen, supra note 33, at 340. 
52. Id.  Another prominent critic of Fiske whose views about trade restrictions in the 1780s 
paralleled Jensen’s was William F. Zornow.  See William Frank Zornow, Georgia Tariff Policies, 
1775 to 1789, 38 GA. HIST. Q. 1, 1–10 (1954); William Frank Zornow, Massachusetts Tariff 
Policies, 1775–1789, in 90 ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 194, 194–216 (1954); William 
Frank Zornow, New York Tariff Policies, 1775–1789, 37 PROC. N.Y. ST. HIST. ASS’N 40, 40–63 
(1956); William Frank Zornow, Tariff Policies in South Carolina, 1775–1789, 56 S.C. HIST. 
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Some economic historians also have doubted whether “either interstate or 
foreign trade was greatly hampered, or that the regional differences in 
recovery and adjustment to being outside the British Empire had much to 
do with this tariff system.”53  In rejoinder, defenders of the traditional 
view—that discriminatory trade policies were a significant problem—have 
pointed to laws in at least seven states that involved “some form of 
discrimination against the commerce of neighboring states,” most of which 
Jensen overlooked.54  Furthermore, the duties on foreign products that were 
then re-exported to states without competitive port facilities had to be borne 
by merchants and consumers in those states.55 
Regardless of who is correct about the actual significance of conflicting 
trade policies (Fiske and Jensen may be arguing the issue in the afterlife), 
the far more important point for constitutional history is that the Americans 
most responsible for bringing the Constitution to fruition were convinced 
that the problem of discriminatory legislation was real, and they proclaimed 
this conviction as a central rationale for establishing national control over 
trade.  Jensen contended somewhat cynically that these “supporters of 
centralized power used the few discriminatory laws as an argument for a 
new government.”56  It is true that the key proponents of the Constitution 
were mainly merchants and planters directly affected by the economic 
turmoil inasmuch as their fortunes were tied to trade, or they were lawyers 
who represented them.  They were not typical of the great mass of 
Americans whose livelihoods depended on subsistence farming.57  Yet 
those who led the effort to revise the Articles did contend, publicly and 
privately, that there were serious conflicts between the states over trade 
regulations.58 
 
MAG. 31, 31–44 (1955); William Frank Zornow, The Tariff Policies of Virginia, 1775–1789, 62 
VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 306, 306–319 (1954).  For a convincing counterpoint to Jensen 
and Zornow, see Denning, supra note 36, at 40–77. 
53. Shepherd, supra note 33, at 35. 
54. Denning, supra note 36, at 60. 
55. See id. at 75 (explaining how discrimination by states against British trade adversely 
affected other states). 
56. Jensen, supra note 33, at 339. 
57. That does not mean the economic problems of the 1780s were not dire or without 
consequence to the average person.  Although economic statistics are imprecise, “the net effect of 
war was a sharp decline in individual income,” and the “painfully slow” recovery was years away 
when the Constitution went into effect.  JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE 
ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA, 1607–1789, at 366–67 (1985). 
58. On perceptions during the 1780s of the trade problem, see Richard B. Collins, Economic 
Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 53 (1988) (“Many writings at the time of 
the Convention condemned commercial exploitation of one state by another with respect to 
foreign trade.  Some discussed exploitation of weak states by stronger ones.  Others decried 
exploitation of favorable geography to tax goods passing through ports on the way to or from less 
favored states.”); see also RICHARD G. ALBION, THE RISE OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK 7 (1939) 
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Madison wrote to Jefferson in Paris a few months before heading to the 
Philadelphia Convention that “[t]he necessity of harmony in the comercial 
regulations of the states has been rendered every day more apparent,” 
reiterating his earlier message that efforts to retaliate against British trade 
restrictions, “instead of succeeding have in every instance recoiled more or 
less on the states which ventured on the trial.”59  On his list of the dozen 
“vices” of the Confederation, Madison included “[t]he practice of many 
States in restricting the commercial intercourse with other States, and 
putting their productions and manufactures on the same footing with those 
of foreign nations.”60  Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 22 that “interfering 
and unneighborly regulations of some States contrary to the true spirit of 
the Union, have in different instances given just cause of umbrage and 
complaint to others.”61 
B. Creating the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
There was almost no recorded debate about the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause at the Convention.  Pinckney’s remark indicated that it 
was a comity provision with the same purpose as its predecessor in the 
Articles, notwithstanding that the texts of the two differed substantially.62  
The counterpart in the Articles was much lengthier—148 words versus 
nineteen.  One change corrected a drafting gaffe in the Articles, which 
provided that “the free inhabitants” of one state were entitled to the 
privileges and immunities of “free citizens” in other states.63  As Madison 
pointed out, that obliged states to grant visitors who were inhabitants but 
not citizens of other states “greater privileges than they may be entitled to 
in their own State.”64 
Additional departures from the Articles were not explained at the time.  
For unstated reasons, the Convention omitted a clause from the Articles 
guaranteeing that “the people of each State shall have free ingress and 
regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the 
 
(“Interstate rivalry and the jumbled condition of the state currencies . . . seriously hampered the 
merchants—a depressed and at times desperate tone runs through their letter-books of those 
years.”); Matson, supra note 32, at 377 (“By the mid-I780s, . . . it was becoming clear to 
Americans concerned about international and interstate developments that distinct state policies 
often pitted some groups of Americans against others.”). 
59. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 22, 1786), reprinted in MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 41, at 476. 
60. James Madison, Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies (April–June, 1786), 
reprinted in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 42, at 348, 350. 
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 1, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton). 
62. See supra text accompanying note 16 (noting Pinckney’s explanation of the purpose for 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
63. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV, para. 1. 
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 1, at 286 (James Madison). 
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privileges of trade and commerce.”65  One possible explanation for this 
deletion could be that “there was to be no constitutional right to travel,” 
that is, the Constitution did not guarantee interstate movement.66  No direct 
evidence supports this explanation, however, and it is hard to see how a 
provision that was “the basis of the union” could not have encompassed the 
right to enter states and engage in trade and commerce.67  When Americans 
were British subjects they could move throughout the empire, and it would 
be remarkable if the Constitution was meant to abrogate a basic freedom 
expressly provided for in the Articles.  A state’s citizens had the liberty to 
enter and leave, and consequently the Framers most likely regarded the 
freedom of interstate movement as “implicit in article IV.  Since the 
privileges and immunities clause grants a citizen rights in another state, any 
attempt by the origin or destination state to prevent interstate travel would 
deny the individual those rights.”68 
The Articles also expressly provided that “the people of each State 
shall . . . enjoy” in “any other State . . . all the privileges of trade and 
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the 
inhabitants thereof respectively.”69  No similar provision was included in 
Article IV, and that has led some to conclude the clause was not about trade 
at all.  According to this view, it was intended “to protect American 
citizens in their privileges and immunities of citizenship, i.e., their natural, 
fundamental rights, against invasions by either states or individuals.”70  
There were other provisions of the Constitution that addressed the specific 
problems in trade regulation and taxation that had plagued the 
Confederation.  Prohibiting state duties, imposts, and tonnage without 
congressional consent directly eliminated the most important sources of 
discrimination.71  Furthermore, Congress’ power over interstate commerce 
 
65. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV, para. 1. 
66. Natelson, supra note 18, at 1183. 
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 537 (Alexander Hamilton).  The Court 
eventually confirmed that Article IV, Section 2 “plainly and unmistakably secures and protects 
the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of 
engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation.”  Ward v. Maryland, 79 
U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871).  
68. Bogen, CASE, supra note 18, at 836. 
69. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV, para. 1. 
70. Antieau, supra note 15, at 2. 
71. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 2–3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid 
by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and 
all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.  No State shall, 
without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage . . . .”).  The Court in 1869 held that 
the Import-Export Clause applied only to trade with foreign nations, not interstate commerce.  See 
Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 133 (1869).  There is a strong argument that 
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could be used to impose uniform rules for trade across borders.  And the 
availability of federal courts for diversity actions was expected to diminish 
discrimination in the judicial arena. 
In actuality, these other anti-discrimination provisions show only that the 
Framers were sufficiently concerned about centralizing control over trade 
and ending discriminatory taxes that they inserted multiple protections.  
States could very well engage in other forms of discrimination not covered 
by the Constitution’s direct prohibitions, such as closing markets to 
outsiders, differentially taxing the property of noncitizens, or imposing 
higher wharfage fees for vessels not owned or sailed by state citizens.  
There also were many ways for states to discriminate with regard to 
property.  In a 1788 Pennsylvania case, for example, the state’s supreme 
court described a Delaware law as “a narrow and contracted one indeed, 
which obliges executors or administrators to discharge the debts due from 
the deceased to his creditors within the state, in preference to every 
other.”72  Moreover, from the perspective of 1787–88, it was less than 
obvious how the commerce power could reach property not moving as 
trade across state lines. 
Interpreting the term “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens” as either 
not encompassing trade or being limited only to “natural, fundamental 
rights,” entirely neglects the breadth of meanings that these words had at 
the time, a subject soon to be explored in depth.73  Neither position has any 
direct support from statements by those involved in framing and ratifying 
the Constitution.  Trading rights and the freedom to move about the empire 
were among the most important privileges that Americans had possessed as 
British subjects,74 and it is unlikely that many would want to diminish 
them.  The relation of “privileges and immunities” to natural rights is more 
 
Woodruff was wrongly decided.  See Collins, supra note 58, at 51–52 (“[I]t is odd that the framers 
would directly forbid state tariffs on foreign goods, but allow them on interstate shipments absent 
an act of Congress to the contrary. . . . [Woodruff’s] reasoning is inconsistent with much of the 
contemporaneous argument about the need for a new Constitution, argument that stressed 
interstate commercial rivalry.”).  
72. Millar v. Hall, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 229, 232 (Pa. 1778) (emphasis added).  Millar involved a 
claim by a Pennsylvania citizen that the discharge in bankruptcy by Maryland for one of its 
citizens was not binding in Pennsylvania.  Id. at 230.  Defense counsel alluded to both the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles in contending 
that the Maryland discharge was binding everywhere.  Id. at 231.  The Court agreed that the 
discharge was binding on choice-of-law grounds.  Id. at 232.  However, contrary to the 
suggestion of Natelson, it did not decide that the bankruptcy relief was a “privilege.”  Id. at 232–
33; see Natelson, supra note 18, at 1165. 
73. See infra text accompanying notes 82–295 (discussing expansive meaning of “privileges” 
and “immunities”).  
74. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing British subjects’ freedom to trade 
and move freely about the British territories); see also infra text accompanying notes 177, 180, 
212–15  (discussing the rights of British subjects to trade and movement). 
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complicated, as we shall see,75 but the terms unquestionably included many 
liberties and advantages that no one regarded as required by natural law. 
Once we examine the many usages of “privileges and immunities,” the 
likeliest explanation for the Convention’s excision of most of the 
provisions in the Articles was that the Framers thought them redundant.  
Just as they trimmed many other clauses to the bare minimum over the 
course of the proceedings, they might have preferred the elegance of the 
more parsimonious version.  Substantively, they could have worried about 
future judicial construals of the clause.  Had it explicitly protected ingress, 
regress, trade, and commerce, the implication could be that this was an 
exclusive listing of “privileges and immunities.”  That could lead to unduly 
narrow interpretations of the clause, whereas “Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens” had broad and familiar connotations for Americans, a point to be 
developed shortly.  Madison also commented in Federalist No. 42 about 
the “confusion of language” in the omitted clause from the Articles, 
observing that the term “all the privileges of trade and commerce” could 
not “easily be determined.”76  Stripping “trade and commerce” from the 
clause still left it indeterminate, but the phrasing invited liberality of 
interpretation rather than a focus on specific subjects (the Court many years 
later decided that there was no substantive difference between the two 
versions).77 
There was a close relationship between the Constitution’s provision for a 
federal judiciary and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The states had 
ignored the Articles when they enacted discriminatory trade laws.  At the 
Convention, Madison “instanced Acts of Virga. & Maryland which give a 
preference to their own citizens in cases where the Citizens (of other states) 
are entitled to equality of privileges by the Articles of Confederation.”78  
William R. Davie similarly commented at the North Carolina Convention 
that “Maryland lately passed a law granting exclusive privileges to her own 
vessels, contrary to the Articles of the Confederation,” but there was no 
means to stop such blatant discriminations.79  A guarantee of privileges and 
immunities was worthless without national judicial enforcement.  State 
courts were known to treat outsiders with “evasion and subterfuge,” 
 
75. See infra text accompanying notes 296–386 (discussing the relationship between natural 
rights and “privileges and immunities”). 
76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 1, at 285 (James Madison). 
77. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975) (asserting that the “briefer form” 
of the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause made “no change of substance or intent, 
unless it was to strengthen the force of the clause in fashioning a single nation”). 
78. James Madison, Remarks at the Federal Convention of 1787 (June 19, 1787), reprinted in 
1 CONST. CONV., supra note 28, at 317. 
79. William R. Davie, Address at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 24, 1788), in 
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 7, 20. 
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Hamilton said.80  The answer was the federal judiciary, which would have 
“no local attachments,” and thus could keep “inviolable . . . that equality of 
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the union will be 
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one 
state or its citizens are opposed to another state or its citizens.”81 
C. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
as Restoring Rights Lost by Independence 
Even though the immediate impetus for adopting the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause was to thwart discrimination in commerce among the 
states, it also had a larger purpose, one that both explains Hamilton’s salute 
to Article IV as the foundation of the union and the Framers’ choice of its 
sweeping, unrestricted language.  The rupture with Great Britain ended all 
the rights Americans had possessed in common as British subjects.  Under 
English law, a person became a subject upon birth within the kingdom,82 or 
by naturalization—which required parliamentary authorization.83  Subjects 
were “under the king’s protection,”84 and in exchange they owed 
“universal and permanent”85 “natural allegiance”86 to the monarch as “a 
debt of gratitude,”87 arising from “an implied contract with the prince.”88  
In short, “immediately upon their birth,”89 subjects possessed “a great 
variety of rights.”90  That included the privilege to do business and own 
property in any part of the kingdom except for places restricted to specific 
persons.91  Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 7 that Americans had been 
“accustomed” since “the earliest settlement of the country” to commerce 
among the colonies “on the basis of equal privileges.”92  With 
independence, however, each state gained sovereignty over its territory, 
with the consequence that Americans no longer had rights of citizenship 
outside of their own states.  Without the Privileges and Immunities Clauses 
of the Articles and Constitution, states would be able to treat citizens of 
 
80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 537 (Alexander Hamilton). 
81. Id. 
82. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *357 (commenting that one’s allegiance to country 
occurs “immediately upon . . . birth”). 
83. See id. at *362 (“Naturalization cannot be performed but by an act of parliament . . . .”). 
84. Id. at *357. 
85. Id. at *358. 
86. Id.  
87. Id. at *357. 
88. Id. at *358. 
89. Id. at *357. 
90. Id. at *359. 
91. See infra text accompanying notes 177, 180, 210–15 (detailing the rights granted to British 
subjects). 
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, supra note 1, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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other states as aliens.  Those clauses assured the continuation of the 
common rights Americans possessed as British subjects.93 
Article IV did not define the rights attendant to national citizenship or 
mandate that states continue to give their citizens the same rights they had 
as British subjects.  The Constitution recognized Americans as at once 
being citizens of the United States and of particular states.94  The rights of 
Americans as national citizens were provided by the Constitution itself and 
statutes enacted pursuant to it.  State law determined the privileges and 
immunities of state citizens.  But by requiring that states extend to citizens 
from other states the same rights they gave their own, the result would be a 
large measure of uniformity in how Americans were treated around the 
union.  There were common assumptions about the legal rights of citizens 
versus aliens that tended to minimize differences among the states, which is 
the subject of the next section. 
II. DEFINING THE “PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS” 
 What constituted “the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens?”  At best, 
the Convention and ratification records left only hints.  The few remarks 
that have been preserved related almost entirely to unfair treatment of 
outsiders in state courts and in taxation and regulation of trade.95  However, 
those were the issues of the moment, which does not exclude broader 
 
93. On the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses as replacing the rights of British 
subjects, see Bogen, CASE, supra note 18, at 861 (“The privileges and immunities clause was 
intended to secure the former intercolonial privileges of movement, citizenship, and trade.”); see 
also BOGEN, PRIVILEGES, supra note 18, at xvii–xviii, 11–17; Thomas H. Burrell, A Story of 
Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval Concept to the Colonies and United States 
Constitution, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 7, 101–02 (2011–2012) (“[The drafters of the Articles] did 
not want fellow colonists to be aliens in the other colonies.  In other words, as a starting point, 
colonists, post-Independence, retained all the rights, liberties, privileges, immunities, and 
advantages of natural-born Englishmen in the other colonies . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
94. In several places, the Constitution refers to either U.S. citizenship or state citizenship 
without defining either.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring Representatives in Congress 
to have at least seven years of U.S. citizenship); id. at art. I § 3, cl. 3 (requiring Senators to have 
at least nine years of U.S. citizenship); id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born 
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States . . . shall be eligible to the Office of President.”); id. at 
art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (allowing jurisdiction of federal courts over “Controversies . . . between a State 
and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”); id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); see also 
id. at amend. XI (disallowing federal jurisdiction over lawsuits “commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State”). 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30, 40, 43–44, 61, 76, 78–81 (detailing instances 
of states’ discriminatory treatment in the areas of trade, commerce, and freedom of movement 
against citizens of other states). 
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coverage.  The clause guaranteed not just some, but all the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship.  In modern terms, it mandated both an economic 
common market in which trade restrictions were removed, and political 
integration of the states by assuring Americans that they would be treated 
like local citizens wherever they went. 
A. The Various Meanings of “Privileges” 
and “Immunities” in the Eighteenth Century 
Whether taken as separate words or together in a phrase, “privileges” 
and “immunities” were used frequently in legal and political discourse in 
the eighteenth century and earlier.  As discrete words, they could be 
synonyms in both everyday language and legal usage.  Samuel Johnson 
defined each with the other word.  Johnson also stated that a “privilege” 
was a “[p]eculiar advantage” or an “[i]mmunity; right not universal,” 
which captured the core idea of a privilege: an advantage, benefit, or 
freedom from government that was restricted to certain people, entities, or 
places.96  Similarly, “immunity” was defined by Johnson as the 
“[d]ischarge from any obligation” or an “exemption from onerous 
duties.”97  To have a privilege, in other words, meant that a person was 
allowed to do something or could refuse to act in some way, and thus 
would have immunity—or freedom—from adverse consequences.  In legal 
dictionaries used by American lawyers in the eighteenth century, a 
privilege typically was defined as a law that “exempted” “a private Person 
or Corporation . . . from the Rigour of the Common Law, or it is some 
Benefit or Advantage granted or allowed to any Person contrary to the 
Course of Law.  [I]t is sometimes used for a place which hath a special 
Immunity.”98  The common law recognized a “writ of privilege,” by 
“which a privileged Person brings to the Court” a claim “for his exemption, 
by reason of some Privilege.”99 
As with many dictionary definitions of legal terms, however, these were 
generalizations that did not entirely capture the varied meanings of 
privileges and immunities in Anglo-American legal and political history.  
 
96. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. 
Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1785) (unpaginated, entry for “privilege”) [hereinafter JOHNSON]. 
97. Id. (entry for “immunity”); see THE STUDENT’S LAW-DICTIONARY; OR COMPLEAT 
ENGLISH LAW-EXPOSITOR (London, Nutt & Gosling 1740) (unpaginated, entry for “immunities”) 
(stating that possessing an immunity meant “to be free from certain Burdens”). 
98. 2 GILES JACOB, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (London, H. Woodfall & W. 
Strahan 8th ed. 1762) (unpaginated, entry for “privilege”). 
99. JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER OF WORDS AND TERMS (London, Nutt & Gosling 
1701) (unpaginated, entry for “writ”).  Blackstone explained that a privileged person who was 
improperly arrested would be released “on motion” without need for a writ of privilege.  1 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *iv (Supp. 1765). 
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Taking into account the types of printed material available to the public in 
the eighteenth century—newspapers, pamphlets, books, charters, grants, 
statutes, law cases, and constitutions—there were thousands of references 
to privileges and immunities, either as separate terms, a pair of words, or 
part of a phrase including terms such as “right” and “liberty.”  Context 
mattered greatly; the words took on very different meanings depending on 
the purpose of the writing.  For Article IV and its predecessor in the 
Articles, the context was the privileges and immunities of state citizens.  
Many of the dictionary definitions were not entirely apposite to this setting, 
and can even be misleading to modern readers.  Although the “peculiar 
advantages” that came from citizenship were “not universal” in the sense of 
natural rights, they certainly applied to almost every free person in 
America, as well as to subjects in Great Britain.  Often the privileges and 
immunities of citizens or subjects had nothing to do with relieving a person 
from the restrictions of the common law.  For example, as will be 
developed, trial by jury was widely regarded as a privilege of citizenship; it 
was not an exemption from a duty otherwise owed by a citizen or 
subject.100  Another privilege, habeas corpus, assured that the common law 
was applied to stop an unlawful detention.101 
In ordinary legal usage, privileges and immunities ran the gamut from 
routine government permissions, “used much as the terms ‘license’ or 
‘permit’ are used today,” to the entitlements of the aristocracy.102  
Legislative or royal grants of property frequently bestowed on the 
recipients various privileges and immunities of ownership.103  Various 
trades, occupations, and businesses were entitled by statute to special legal 
benefits, including exclusive rights to deal in specific products and to limit 
entry by competitors.104  In trading agreements with other nations, a 
 
100. See infra text accompanying notes 249, 375, and notes 250, 253 (recognizing that trial by 
jury was recognized as a privilege of citizenship). 
101. See infra text accompanying note 251 and note 252 (habeas corpus recognized as 
privilege of citizenship). 
102. Natelson, supra note 18, at 1140. 
103. See infra notes 152, 156  (describing specific grants of property under the Grant of New 
Hampshire and Masonia in 1635 and the Charter of Massachusetts Bay in 1691); see, e.g., 
Charter of Pennsylvania, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR 
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3035, 3036–37 (Francis Newton 
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (granting William 
Penn the territory of the colony and numerous privileges, such as fishing and mining). 
104. See FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776–1790, at 17–18 (1979) (detailing monopoly privileges); Burrell, supra note 93, 
at 92 (“Royal privileges and immunities to merchants and entities historically included an 
element of exclusivity.”); Natelson, supra note 18, at 1160 (describing various business 
privileges); see infra text accompanying notes 109–11 (giving examples of rights afforded to 
certain economic pursuits). 
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provision might give a country’s merchants “all the privileges and 
immunities which are granted to the most favoured nations.”105 
Legislative approvals of incorporation, Blackstone explained, created 
“artificial persons”106 with “privileges and immunities,”107 including ones 
that no natural person could possess.  The most important of these was the 
ability to hold property in perpetuity—a corporation was “but one person in 
law, a person that never dies.”108  At that time in Great Britain and 
America—both before and after the Revolution—all corporations, whether 
for-profit or not, were created via special legislative enactments.  These 
grants often gave the corporation a monopoly over a particular field or 
permitted it to operate with limited competition while subject to continuing 
regulation.  A typical instance was a 1788 statute in South Carolina 
establishing a company for the purpose of opening certain rivers to 
navigation by erecting “locks, dams or canals.”109  The application for 
incorporation requested that the legislature invest the company “with ample 
powers, privileges and immunities for carrying their purpose into speedy 
effect.”110  In approving the application, the legislature authorized the 
company not only to build the requisite facilities, but as well to set and 
collect tolls up to a specified limit.111 
Legislatures also incorporated religious societies, usually church 
congregations, vesting them with a range of powers, including the right to 
sue and be sued, receive charitable donations, own property, and operate 
schools.  For example, when incorporating an Episcopal congregation in 
1786, the Pennsylvania assembly granted it specific powers like these, and 
added a general investment of “such powers and privileges as are enjoyed 
by other religious and charitable Societies incorporated within this 
State.”112  A Maryland law in 1785 incorporated a charitable body to 
 
105. THOMAS BANKES, ET AL., A NEW, ROYAL, AND COMPLETE SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL 
GEOGRAPHY, ANTIENT AND MODERN 207 (London, J. Cooke c. 1790).  
106. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *455. 
107. Id. at *456. 
108. Id. 
109. An Act to Establish a Company for Opening the Navigation of Broad and Pacolet Rivers 
(Feb. 29, 1788) [hereinafter An Act to Establish a Company], reprinted in PUBLIC LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA 458 (John Fauchereaud Grimké ed., Phila., Robert Aitken 1790); 
see also An Act for Building a Bridge Across Ashley River (Mar. 13, 1788), reprinted in PUBLIC 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, supra, at 490–91 (authorizing Bridge proprietors to 
collect tolls and enjoy “the several rights, privileges and immunities” granted in a prior law). 
110. An Act to Establish a Company, supra note 109, at pmbl. 
111. See id. § 3 (authorizing the collection of tolls). 
112. An Act for Removing the Protestant Episcopal Chapel of St. Thomas, in Carnarvan 
township, and for Incorporating the Congregation Thereof, ch. 13, § 1, reprinted in LAWS 
ENACTED IN THE SECOND SITTING OF THE TENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 40 (Phila., Thomas Bradford 1786); see also An Act to 
Incorporate the Episcopal Congregation Belonging to St. Peter’s Church, ch. 13, § 3, reprinted in 
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provide for the relief of widows and children of clergy, giving it a variety 
of legal powers, and “in general [to] have and exercise all such rights, 
franchises, privileges and immunities, as by law are incident and necessary 
to corporations of this kind.”113  Similar provisions appeared in university 
incorporations, such as the one for Harvard College, which was re-
chartered in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, affirming that its 
president and fellows “in their corporate capacity . . . shall have, hold, use, 
exercise, and enjoy, all the powers, authorities, rights, liberties, privileges, 
immunities, and franchises which they now have.”114 
Certain types of people and places were entitled to privileges and 
immunities under various statutes and the common law.  Ambassadors 
from foreign countries—and their personal servants—possessed many, 
including immunity from most civil suits or criminal prosecutions.115  
Blackstone wrote that “the rights, the powers, the duties, and the privileges 
of embassadors are determined by the law of nature and nations, and not by 
any municipal constitutions.”116  The common law and various statutes in 
Great Britain and America protected these rights in great detail because 
their infringement could produce an international incident.  Civil process 
executed against an ambassador, his property, or servants was “null and 
void,” Blackstone recounted, and anyone doing so “shall be deemed 
violaters of the law of nations,” subject to criminal prosecution by 
statute.117  After independence, American states also enacted protective 
legislation of this sort, such as a Connecticut statute making it a crime to 
violate “the Immunities of Ambassadors, or other public Ministers, . . . 
 
LAWS ENACTED IN THE SECOND SITTING OF THE TENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra, at 38 (granting a newly incorporated church “all 
and singular like powers, authorities, rights, privileges and immunities” given by statute in 1783 
to a Philadelphia church); An Act to Incorporate the Vestry and Church-Wardens of the Episcopal 
Parish of St. ‘George’s, 1789 S.C. Acts 29 (pmbl.) (Dorchester) (establishing that a parish was 
incorporated “and vested with all the powers, privileges and immunities which any of their sister 
churches enjoy”). 
113. An Act to Provide a Fund for the Relief of the Widows and Children of the Clergy of the 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the State, ch. 78, § 4, reprinted in 1784 LAWS OF MARYLAND, 
supra note 48, at 426, 427. 
114. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. I, ch. 555, § 1; see also An Act for Amending and 
Establishing the Charter of the College of New-Jersey, ch. 191, § 2 (Mar. 13, 1780), reprinted in 
ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-JERSEY 121 (Trenton, Isaac Collins 
1784) (declaring that trustees of College of New-Jersey were to “forever . . . have, hold and 
enjoy, all . . . the Advantages, Privileges, and Immunities, granted” in its charter). 
115. See generally ABRAHAM DE WICQUEFORT, THE RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND OFFICE OF 
EMBASSADORS AND PUBLICK MINISTERS (John Digby trans., London, Charles Davis 1740) 
(treatise on “the Rights and Privileges” of ambassadors). 
116. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *246. 
117. Id. at *248. 
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under the Limitation allowed by the Laws and Usages of Nations.”118 
Churches and clergy possessed “numerous privileges and 
immunities,”119 David Hume wrote in his History of England, which he 
thought accounted for why religious authorities were able to preserve 
“Roman learning”120 through the “barbarous ages.”121  The coronation 
oath for British kings, as described by Blackstone, required swearing “to 
preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this realm, and to the churches 
committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or 
shall appertain to them.”122  These were “Divine Rights or Privileges,”123 
not derived from municipal law, Rev. John Turner argued in 1707.124  
Churches operated “ecclesiastical courts” that “decide[d] many questions 
which are properly of temporal cognizance,” Blackstone wrote.125  These 
included actions to compel payment of tithes,126 recover dues owed to 
clergy for their services,127 order repair of neglected church property,128 
adjudicate “matrimonial causes”129 such as divorce and spousal 
maintenance,130 and determine inheritances.131  Cases in these courts were 
“regulated according to the practice of the civil and canon laws; or rather 
according to a mixture of both.”132  Individual clergy, and especially 
bishops, possessed an array of personal and property rights, such as income 
from benefices and exemption from some taxes, that were referred to as 
privileges and immunities, or like terms.  Bishops, who were entitled to sit 
in the House of Lords, had “the same Privileges with Temporal Barons,”133 
 
118. An Act for Securing to Foreigners in this State, their Rights, According to the Laws of 
Nations, and to Prevent any Infractions of Said Laws, reprinted in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 83 (New-London, Timothy Green 1784).  
119. 3 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR 
TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 297 (London, T. Cadell 1789).  
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 296. 
122. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *228. 
123. JOHN TURNER, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH 91 (London, John Wyat 1707).  
124. Id. 
125. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *98–*99 (Oxford, 1768). 
126. Id. at *88.  
127. Id. at *89. 
128. Id. at *91–*92. 
129. Id. at *93. 
130. Id. at *94. 
131. Id. at *96. 
132. Id. at *100. 
133. WILLIAM NELSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CLERGY OF THAT PART OF GREAT-BRITAIN 
‘CALL’D ENGLAND 117 (London, Nutt & Gosling 1732); see Burrell, supra note 93, at 19–20 
(describing privileges and immunities of a bishop). 
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including the “Privilege of Hunting in the King’s Forests.”134 
“The privileges of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite,”135 
Blackstone wrote, the greatest of which was the right of “parliament itself” 
to determine the extent of its own privileges.136  The open-ended nature of 
parliamentary privileges was “in great measure”137 responsible for 
preserving “[t]he dignity and independence of the two houses.”138  
However, two privileges stood out among the rest.  First, under the English 
Bill of Rights, members were entitled to “privilege of speech,”139 meaning 
that what they said in debates and proceedings “ought not be impeached or 
questioned in any ‘court or place out of parliament.’”140  Second, members 
of Parliament, as well as their personal servants and horses, could not be 
arrested for most crimes or subjected to civil suit during the legislative term 
and for a period thereafter, which were “immunities as antient as Edward 
the confessor” in the eleventh century.141  Assaulting a member or his 
servants was not just a crime, but “a high contempt of [P]arliament, and 
there punished with the utmost severity.”142  These protections were 
instrumental to the development of parliamentary independence.  
Blackstone thought that they safeguarded legislators “not only from being 
molested by their fellow-subjects, but also more especially from being 
oppressed by the power of the crown.”143  Both the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution contained similar shields for those 
serving in Congress.144 
The right to exploit government-owned or controlled resources was 
 
134. Burrell, supra note 93, at 19–20; see also JOHN ADAMS, THE FLOWERS OF MODERN 
HISTORY 45 (London, G. Kearsley 1790) (“The Christian emperors had enriched the church.  
They had lavished on it privileges and immunities.”); NELSON, supra note 133, at 59 (discussing 
the special “Privileges” of the Archbishop of Canterbury). 
135. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *159.   
136. Id.  
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at *160 (quoting Eng. Bill Rts., 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 9 (Eng.)). 
141. Id.   
142. Id. 
143. Id. at *159. 
144. The Constitution provided that members of Congress were “privileged from Arrest 
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning 
from the same,” unless the charge was “Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 6, cl. 1.  Likewise, they “shall not be questioned in any other Place” regarding any Speech 
or Debate in either House.”  Id.  The Articles had a similar provision, protecting members of 
Congress from “arrests or imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and 
attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of peace.”  ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 5.  On the importance of these immunities to 
parliamentary independence, see Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative 
Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1122–35 (1973). 
ORIGINS OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2013  10:46 AM 
2013] Origins of the Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship 27 
commonly termed a privilege in the eighteenth century.  The term 
frequently appeared in treaties, grants and statutes—as well as 
commentaries about them—that authorized use of public resources such as 
fisheries;145 shore lands for catching bait,146 drying and processing fish;147 
forests for hunting148 and cutting wood;149 pasturage for farm animals,150 
 
145. See, e.g., WILLIAM BOLLAN, THE ANCIENT RIGHT OF THE ENGLISH NATION TO THE 
AMERICAN FISHERY 50 (London, S. Baker 1764) (describing how the French had “direct[ed] [its] 
fisherman to proceed and fish upon the banks left to the English [by treaty], in order to support 
her pretensions, and make to themselves a privilege of fishing where they pleased by force of 
custom”); id. at 82 (describing a treaty article granting “[t]he privilege for the Spanish nation to 
fish upon the banks of Newfoundland”); id. at 92 (referring to “[t]he important privilege granted 
by” a treaty, whereby “under certain limitations and restrictions to the subjects of France for 
fishing and drying their codfish on a certain part of the banks of Newfoundland has not been 
refused by Great Britain”); WILLIAM PEPPERRELL, AN ACCURATE AND AUTHENTC [SIC] 
ACCOUNT OF THE TAKING OF CAPE-BRETON, IN THE YEAR MDCCLV 29 (London, J. Staples 
1758) (describing how the French had made “themselves a privilege, as it were, of fishing almost 
where they pleased” in the Newfoundland fishery); id. at 37 (“[S]upposing the French entirely 
excluded this Fishery . . . and allows them no longer any privilege at Newfoundland.”); REASONS 
WHY THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY SHOULD NOT NOW ENDEAVOUR TO REGAIN THE WHALE 
FISHERY (London, c. 1725) (describing how a group of merchants had been given “the exclusive 
Privilege” of the Greenland whale fishery); JOHN ROSE, AN ESSAY UPON THE BRITISH FISHERIES 
32–33 (Edinburgh, W. Creech 1785) (describing “what value the Swedes put upon the privilege 
of fishing in our seas”). 
146. See, e.g., GRIFFITH WILLIAMS, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ISLAND OF NEWFOUNDLAND, WITH 
THE NATURE OF ITS TRADE, AND METHOD OF CARRYING ON THE FISHERY 23 (London, Thomas 
Cole 1765) (describing a “Patent for a Man to have the sole Privilege of drawing Baite at a certain 
Beech”). 
147. See, e.g., An Act for the Encouragement of the Fisheries Carried on from Great Britain, 
Ireland, and the British Dominions in Europe, and for Securing the Return of the Fishermen, 
Sailors, and Others Employed in the Said Fisheries, to the Ports Thereof, at the End of the Fishing 
Season, 15 Geo. 3, cc. 31, § 4 (1775) (restricting “the Privilege or Right of drying Fish on the 
shores of Newfoundland . . . [to] his Majesty’s Subjects arriving in Newfoundland, from any other 
Country except from Great-Britain, or one of the British Dominions of Europe”); WILLIAMS, 
supra note 146, at 16 (“[N]one but the Inhabitants of Great-Britain, Newfoundland, with Jersey 
and Guernsey . . . should have the Privilege of being possessed of any Fish Rooms, or Plantations 
in the Island of Newfoundland.”). 
148. See FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, art. XII (Feb. 2, 1683) (“[T]hat the 
Inhabitants of this Province . . . [shall have] liberty to fowl and hunt upon the Lands they hold, 
and all other Lands therein not enclosed; and to fish, in all Waters in the said Lands, and in all 
Rivers and Rivulets in and belonging to this Province and Territories thereof, with Liberty to 
draw his or their Fish on Shore on any Man’s Lands, so as it be not to the Detriment, or 
Annoyance of the Owner thereof.”); An Act for Prevention of Misunderstanding between the 
Tributary Indians, and Other His Majesty’s Subjects of this Colony and Dominion (1705) 
[hereinafter An Act for Prevention of Misunderstanding], reprinted in ROBERT BEVERLEY, AN 
ABRIDGMENT TO THE PUBLICK LAWS OF VIRGINIA, IN FORCE AND USE, JUNE 10, 1720, at 90, 91 
(London, F. Fayram, J. Clark, & T. Saunders 2d ed. 1728) (“The Indian shall likewise enjoy their 
wonted Conveniency of Oystering and Fishing, and of gathering [various wild plants] on the 
Lands belonging to the English . . . .”); WILLIAM DOUGLASS, A SUMMARY, HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL, OF THE FIRST PLANTING, PROGRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS, AND PRESENT STATE OF 
THE BRITISH SETTLEMENTS IN NORTH-AMERICA 200 (London, R. & J. Dodsley 1755) 
(describing agreement granting Indian tribes “the privilege of hunting, fowling, and fishing”). 
149. See, e.g., WILLIAM NELSON, THE LAWS CONCERNING GAME 251 (London, F. 
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lands for harvesting wild plants,151 mining,152 or obtaining salt.153  Treaties 
specified that the subjects of signatory nations could exercise these 
privileges.154 
Americans during the Confederation period were particularly concerned 
about access to one of the greatest natural resources of the day: fisheries, 
especially those in the North Atlantic that had been effectively closed 
during the Revolution.  When Americans were still British subjects, the 
harvesting of fish and whales from this region was referred to as “the 
original right of the English nation,” protected by “British naval power,” 
and diminished only “by royal grants, encroachments and cessions.”155  
These were the concerns of treaties just alluded to, which treated access to 
fisheries as rights afforded to the subjects of signatory states.  In late 1781, 
not long after the decisive victory at Yorktown, the Boston town meeting 
turned its attention to fisheries with a lengthy instruction to its legislative 
representatives.  Emphasizing “how vast an importance the preservation of 
this trade is to every part of the Commonwealth,” the instructions asserted 
that “the Fishery,”156 which “uninterruptedly enjoyed by our Ancestors 
 
Richardson & C. Lintot 6th ed. 1762) (describing a case in which a fine was imposed for cutting 
wood from a nobleman’s forest; the court rejected the “Claim of a Privilege to fell Wood in the 
Forest, without Licence or View of the Foresters”); see also Letter from Thomas Pelham-Holles 
to Ricardo Wall (July 4, 1754), quoted in Lawrence Henry Gipson, British Diplomacy in the Light 
of Anglo-Spanish New World Issues, 1750–1757, 51 AM. HIST. REV. 627, 640 (1946) 
(remonstrance from Duke of Newcastle, First Lord of the Treasury, to the Spanish ambassador to 
Great Britain, about an attack by Spain on British woodcutting operations in the Honduras, 
saying: “We are entitled to that Privilege by the Word & Meaning of the Treaty of Utrecht”). 
150. An Act for Dividing and Inclosing Several Commons or Wastes, and also Several 
Common Fields, Meadows, Pastures, and Waste Grounds, Lying within the Manor of 
Wimeswould, in the County of Leicester, 30 Geo. 2, cc. 53, cl. 2 (1757) (granting certain 
individuals “an exclusive Right, Liberty, or Privilege, to turn and depasture their Beasts, Sheep, 
and commonable Cattle, upon the said several Commons, Fields, and waste Grounds”); JAMES 
ANDERSON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEANS OF EXCITING A SPIRIT OF NATIONAL INDUSTRY; 
CHIEFLY INTENDED TO PROMOTE THE AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE, MANUFACTURES, AND 
FISHERIES, OF SCOTLAND 100 (Edinburgh, Charles Elliot 1777) (“These large flocks of sheep 
have each, by law, a privilege of pasturage in certain districts . . . .”). 
151. See, e.g., An Act for Prevention of Misunderstanding, supra note 148, at 91 (providing 
that Indians could gather various wild plants on specified lands). 
152. See., e.g., Grant of New Hampshire and Masonia (April 22, 1635), reprinted in 29 N.H. 
STATE PAPERS 64 (Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., Concord, Edward N. Pearson 1896) (granting a 
man title to all “mines & Mineralls as well as Royal mines of Gold and Silver as other mines 
minerals pretious stones quarreys & all . . . other . . . Royaltys & priviledges ffranchises & 
preheminences” on the specified lands and waters”).  
153. See, e.g., DOUGLASS, supra note 148, at 89 (referring to the British “privilege of making 
and carrying salt from the island of Salt Tortugas,” granted by the Spanish in a treaty); id. at 200 
(describing an agreement with Indian nations granting them “the privilege of hunting, fowling, 
and fishing as formerly”). 
154. See supra notes 145, 147 (referring to treaty provisions). 
155. BOLLAN, supra note 145, at 1.  
156. Instructions of Boston Town Meeting 1, ¶4 (Dec. 14, 1781) (Boston, Benjamin Edes & 
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from time immemorial, and secured to them by charter,” was “an ancient 
privilege, and one of those liberties, for the security of which, that firm 
league of friendship was entered into by the Thirteen States.”157  To 
preserve this privilege, the representatives were told to demand that 
Congress “give positive instructions to their Commissioners for 
negociating a peace to make the right of the United States to the FISHERY 
an indispensable article of treaty.”158  Article three of the Treaty of 
Paris accomplished this end, as it was agreed that “the People of the 
United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the Right to take Fish 
of every kind” off of Newfoundland and “at all other places in the Sea 
where the Inhabitants of both Countries used at any time heretofore to 
fish.”159 
These varied usages of privileges and immunities represented more than 
a list of rights.  They illustrated a characteristic of Anglo-American law: an 
endless array of legal differentiations among people and their occupations 
that carried corresponding rights and duties.160  This was especially so in 
Great Britain, where hereditary distinctions and social rankings among 
subjects correlated with specific legal entitlements.  For example, a British 
commentator in 1776 referred to “the lords” as “[n]ext in rank to the king,” 
who had the “privilege of sitting in parliament in their own rights.”161  
Most of these privileges and immunities were not bestowed on everyone in 
Great Britain, yet only subjects could possess them.  Other privileges and 
immunities were commonly held by all subjects, as the next section shows. 
 
Sons 1781).  The Charter of Massachusetts Bay in 1691 granted access to various “Fishings” to 
the governing council of New England, along with “Lands Soiles Grounds Havens Ports Rivers 
Waters . . . Mines and Mineralls as well Royall Mines of Gold and Silver as other Mines and 
Mineralls Pretious Stones Quarries and all and singular other Comodities Jurisdiccons Royalties 
Priviledges Franchises and Preheminences both within the said Tract of Land upon the Main and 
alsoe within the Islands and Seas adjoining.”  3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 103, at 1870. 
157. Instructions of Boston Town Meeting, supra note 156, at 2, ¶6. 
158. Id. at 2, ¶ 7.   
159. Definitive Treaty of Peace, art. III, Sept. 2, 1783, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 151, 153 (David Hunter Miller ed., 
1931).  Limited privileges also were given to “American Fishermen . . . to dry and cure Fish” on 
specified British territories.  Id. at 153–54. 
160. See Burrell, supra note 93, at 11–97 (detailing numerous legal rights and duties enjoyed 
by various British subjects). 
161. FRANCIS STOUGHTON SULLIVAN, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF 
ENGLAND (London, Edward Dilly, Charles Dilly & Joseph Johnson 2d ed. 1776).  Members of 
the British peerage had “many privileges,” including seats in the House of Lords, exemption from 
arrest (as mentioned earlier in the text), as well as the right to be tried for crimes only by the 
Lords.  See AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND PRESENT STATE OF GREAT BRITAIN 120 
(London, John Newbery 1759) [hereinafter AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONSTITUTION].  
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B. The Privileges and Immunities of Subjects and Citizens in the 
Eighteenth Century 
The privileges and immunities of subjects and citizens pertained to a 
very different context than most of the usages just considered.  Because 
they applied to virtually all free inhabitants, these rights were the opposite 
of the special benefits conferred on select people, institutions, or 
occupations within a state or nation.  Indeed, in America, the notion of 
conferring special rights on subgroups of the population conflicted with 
republican conceptions of equality.  Joseph Priestley wrote in 1788: 
“Personal privileges and immunities, which are not necessary for the good 
of the whole, are always justly offensive.”162  Two state constitutions 
included provisions to thwart conferring special privileges, particularly the 
type associated with hereditary rights.  The North Carolina Declaration of 
Rights in 1776 provided: “That no hereditary emoluments, privileges, or 
honors ought to be granted or conferred in this state.”163 
The rights of subjects under English law in the eighteenth century can be 
determined from two different perspectives.  The first approach is negative: 
consider the legal treatment of aliens, those “born out of the king’s 
dominions, or allegiance,” in contrast to the rights of natural subjects.164  
Americans had insisted prior to the Revolution on being treated as British 
subjects, not aliens; consequently it makes sense that they would not want 
to be regarded as aliens when visiting or trading in other states after 
independence.165  As Blackstone commented, though aliens were entitled 
by the common law and statutes to many of the rights held by British 
subjects, “their rights are much more circumscribed, being acquired only 
by residence here, and lost whenever they remove.”166  The second way to 
 
162. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LECTURES ON HISTORY, AND GENERAL POLICY 258 (Dublin, P. Byrne 
1788). 
163. N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XXII; see also Va. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 
1776, § 4 (“That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or 
privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being 
descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary.”). 
164. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *361.  
165. See Burrell, supra note 93, at 103 (noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
“may be viewed as serving a citizenship function nominally related to the former ‘privileges and 
immunities of Englishmen’ concept”). 
166. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *359; see CLIVE PARRY, NATIONALITY AND 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 29–30 (1957) 
(noting the disparity in customs rates between aliens and subjects, as well as aliens’ inability to 
hold land at common law); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 459 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 2d ed. 
1899); Burrell, supra note 93, at 56–58 & nn.173–75 (citing, inter alia, 9 WILLIAM S. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 93–94 (3d ed. 1944)) (discussing rights bestowed 
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discern the rights of subjects is positive, by examining contemporaneous 
descriptions of their content. 
1. The Legal Rights and Disabilities of Aliens 
Only “alien-friends, or such whose countries are in peace with ours,” 
had any “rights” or “privileges” at all, Blackstone wrote.167  “Alien-
enemies” possessed none, “unless by the king’s special favour, during time 
of war.”168  Aliens usually could have no ownership rights in real estate, 
although they were permitted to rent a house for “habitation” or acquire 
“personal estate” that was “of a transitory and moveable nature.”169  It was 
impossible for an alien to own land in Great Britain, Blackstone explained, 
because of the inherent tie between “a permanent property in lands” and 
“allegiance” to the king.170  However, the king could declare an alien to be 
a “denizen,” with many of the rights of subjects, including the ability to 
purchase land.171  Aliens were allowed to “trade as freely as other people,” 
Blackstone claimed, although official discrimination against them was 
common, such as being “subject to certain higher duties at the custom-
house.”172  In the past, certain “alien artificers” had been forbidden “to 
work for themselves” in England, but those restrictions had been “virtually 
repealed” when Blackstone wrote in 1765.173  Aliens could “bring an 
action” in court “concerning personal property,” and “make a will, and 
dispose of his personal estate”—again, land was excluded.174  They could 
not serve on the king’s executive council or in Parliament, nor could they 
hold “any office of trust, civil or military, or be capable of any grant from 
the crown.”175  These were the “principal lines” of distinction between 
subjects and aliens, Blackstone wrote, but there were many other statutes 
either imposing constraints on aliens or giving them permission to do 
something otherwise restricted to subjects.176 
Subjects or citizens, by definition, possessed privileges and immunities 
denied to aliens and denizens.  Thus, a list of rights belonging to subjects 
can be produced by counting everything that aliens and denizens were 
 
on aliens by Henry VII in 1501 Charter to Warde).  
167. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *360–61. 
168. Id. at *361. 
169. Id. at *360. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at *362.  Blackstone described denizens as being “in a kind of middle state between 
an alien, and natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them.”  Id. 
172. Id. at *360. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at *362. 
176. Id. at *359; see Burrell, supra note 93, at 55 n.275 (“Restricting alien trade in the 
colonies was a theme throughout the colonial experience.”). 
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denied by English law: “the right to travel and reside; the right to acquire, 
hold, and convey real estate, including the right to inherit and transmit by 
inheritance such property; the freedom from other trade and commercial 
restrictions customarily imposed on aliens; and the rights to elect and be 
elected to public office.”177 
This inventory corresponds well with later judicial interpretations of the 
privileges and immunities of state citizenship, such as in Corfield v. 
Coryell.178  Nevertheless, it is incomplete in stating the rights possessed by 
a subject or a citizen.  Many of the rights extended to aliens were also the 
privileges and immunities of subjects or citizens.  Subjects or citizens 
received them en masse at birth or upon naturalization, along with a 
panoply of other rights.  Other rights were gained by grants and statutes.  
Aliens gained only those that were bestowed on them, and these fluctuated 
depending on policy considerations.  For example, there generally were no 
barriers to aliens owning personal property in Great Britain, which 
Blackstone termed an “indulgence to strangers” that was “necessary for the 
advancement of trade.”179  British subjects had the right to reside and do 
business anywhere within the kingdom—not as an indulgence, but as a 
birthright.  “Colonial inhabitants were all originally the King’s subjects, 
and no colony treated the inhabitants of other colonies as aliens.”180 
2. Affirmative Depictions of the Rights of Subjects and Citizens 
A different way of determining the privileges and immunities of either 
subjects or citizens is to examine the affirmative depictions of those rights.  
This requires considering a variety of legal and political contexts in which 
privileges and immunities were recognized based on citizenship or 
residence.  Colonial charters, laws establishing municipalities and the rights 
of residents, and naturalization statutes all referred to privileges and 
immunities.  Moreover, revolutionary literature, declarations, and early 
state constitutions commonly invoked the rights and privileges of the 
people as either British subjects or citizens of the new American states. 
Colonial charters included provisions that were close analogues to the 
protections for privileges and immunities in the Confederation and the 
Constitution.181  A key component of these charters was the assurance that 
 
177. David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of 
American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1493 (2005). 
178. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (1823) (listing rights protected by 
Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
179. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *360. 
180. Bogen, CASE, supra note 18, at 861. 
181. See id. at 800 (“These charter guarantees resemble the article IV provisions of the 
Constitution.”); Burrell, supra note 93, at 47–89 (describing charter privileges and immunities).  
Colonial charters, whether royal, corporate or proprietary, also authorized local governance.  
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settlers and their children would be considered British citizens—not aliens 
or denizens—and thus receive all the attendant protections and benefits of 
English law.  The first charter for Virginia, granted by James I in 1606, 
assured colonists that they would “have and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, 
and Immunities, within any of our other Dominions, to all Intents and 
Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, within this our Realm of 
England, or any other of our said Dominions.”182  The Maryland Charter, 
granted by Charles I in 1632, bestowed on colonists “all Privileges, 
Franchises and Liberties of this our Kingdom of England,” as if they “were 
born within our said Kingdom of England.”183  The charters for 
Connecticut and Rhode Island, granted in 1662 and 1663 by Charles II, 
provided that the colonies’ residents “shall have and enjoy all Liberties and 
Immunities of free and natural Subjects” in England.184  North Carolina’s 
1655 charter similarly granted colonists “all liberties, franchises, and 
privileges” of citizens in England—the same terms used in Delaware’s 
1701 charter.185  William Penn’s Charter of Privileges in 1701 extended to 
inhabitants of Pennsylvania the “Liberties, Privileges and Benefits, granted 
jointly to them in this Charter,” which included religious freedom, an 
elected assembly, the right of criminal suspects to “the same Privileges of 
Witnesses and Council as their Prosecutors,” the determination of property 
rights by the “ordinary Course of Justice,” and even provisions for 
licensing and regulation of public houses.186 
Although the terminology employed in these charters varied somewhat, 
there was no apparent difference in meaning among them.  “Throughout 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, one finds countless 
 
Burrell, supra note 93, at 65–72; see id. at 75 (“[C]olonial governance, like borough governance” 
in England, “depended on and was governed by royal privileges and immunities.”).  
182. First Virginia Charter (1606), para. 15, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 3788. 
183. Charter of Maryland (1632), art. X, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 1681. 
184. Charter of Connecticut (1662), para. 6, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 533; see Charter of & Rhode Island & Providence Plantations 
(1663), para. 10, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 
3220 (“[Colonists] shall have and enjoye all libertyes and immunityes of . . . naturall subjects . . . 
borne within the realme of England.”). 
185. Charter of Carolina (1665), para. 7, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 2765 (granting colonists “all liberties, franchises, and 
privileges, of this our kingdom, . . . as our liege people, born within the same”). 
186. Charter of Privileges Granted by William Penn to the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania and 
Territories (1701), art. I–VII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 103, at 3076–79; see also Charter of Delaware (1701), pmbl., reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 558 (“I the said William Penn do declare, grant 
and confirm, unto all the Freemen, Planters and Adventurers, and other Inhabitants in this 
Province and Territories, these following Liberties, Franchises and Privileges . . . .”). 
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examples of the terms ‘rights,’ ‘advantages,’ ‘liberties,’ ‘privileges,’ and 
‘immunities’ used interchangeably, and often at the same time.”187  These 
charter provisions offered the reverse protection of the later Privileges and 
Immunities Clauses: those migrating to the colonies or born there retained 
the rights of English-born citizens.  Nonetheless, the substance of the rights 
protected was similar.188  Just as English colonists thought themselves 
entitled to the protections of British law, so too visitors from one American 
state to another could expect to be treated like citizens for legal purposes.  
Both contributed to nation-building—or empire-building in the case of the 
British—by extending to citizens the same rights throughout the land. 
In establishing municipalities, legislation enacted by Parliament and the 
American states used similar terms to depict the powers entrusted to the 
local governments being established as well as the rights of their residents.  
A representative example is a 1790 New York statute that established the 
new limits of two towns, and then broadly provided that they “shall enjoy 
all the rights, privileges and immunities which are granted to other towns 
within this State.”189  The great majority of enabling statutes for 
municipalities, whether in America or England, followed this formula, 
which built upon the unspecified preexisting laws for other cities and 
towns.  Some statutes gave municipalities “peculiar immunities and 
privileges,” as did a 1784 New Jersey law establishing Perth-Amboy as a 
“commercial cit[y] . . . with such powers, privileges, jurisdictions and 
immunities, as shall conduce to the encouragement of commerce.”190  
According to the act, “commercial cities require a peculiar mode of 
 
187. Kurt T. Lash, Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges And 
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1252 (2010); see MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 64–
65 (1986) (noting that “rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities, seem to have been used 
interchangeably”); id. (giving examples of these terms being used interchangeably); Michael Kent 
Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of 
Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1094–98 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, 
Historical] (same); see also CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 38 (1981) (“The American generations that ratified the 
Constitution . . . used the terms, ‘rights,’ ‘liberties,’ ‘privileges,’ and ‘immunities’ as virtual 
synonyms.”); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 166–69 
(1998) (including numerous examples of synonymous uses of the terms privileges, immunities, 
rights, and freedoms); id. at 169 (noting that Blackstone used “the words privileges and 
immunities . . . to describe various entitlements in the landmark English charters of liberty”).  
188. On colonial charters as antecedents to the Privilege and Immunity Clauses, see Bogen, 
CASE, supra note 18, at 796–810; Lash, supra note 187, at 1254–55 (discussing the meaning of 
“privileges and immunities” when paired together). 
189. An Act for Dividing the Town of Watervliet and the Town of Cocksakie (Mar. 8, 1790), 
1789–90 N.Y. Laws 127, in 3 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 13, 13 (New York City, 
1790). 
190. Act of Dec. 21, 1784 (Dec. 11, 1784), prmbl., reprinted in LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-
JERSEY 64 (William Patterson ed., Newark, 1800) (incorporating City of Perth-Amboy).  
ORIGINS OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2013  10:46 AM 
2013] Origins of the Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship 35 
government, for maintaining their internal police, and commercial 
transactions require more expeditious and summary tribunals than 
others.”191  The legislation then set up a mayor-council form of 
government for the city, with specific powers relating to business, 
including a “commercial court” to adjudicate “all causes of a commercial 
matter . . . in the most summary way.”192 
A related type of statute conferred rights on municipal residents.  New 
York, for example, passed a law in 1785 creating the city of Hudson, which 
provided that every freeman residing there for four months and paying 
taxes “shall be entitled to every freedom, right, privilege and immunity of 
the said city, and be considered, to all intents and purposes, a free citizen 
thereof.”193  Similar provisions were enacted in many other states, and 
these traced to language in colonial statutes creating towns, which 
themselves were analogous to acts of Parliament recognizing the privileges 
and immunities of boroughs, counties, and other types of local 
government.194  Whatever terms were used in laws to depict the benefits of 
 
191. Id. 
192. Id. § 13. 
193. An Act for Incorporating the Inhabitants Residing Within the Limits Therein Mentioned 
(Apr. 22, 1785), in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 197 (New York City, 2d ed. 1798). 
194. See, e.g., An Act for Incorporating Part of the Town of Stratford (Oct., 1800), in 1 THE 
PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT ch. 1, 106, 107 § 4 (Hartford, 1808) 
(stating that inhabitants of those towns who held “real Estate” or did “regular business” in new 
borough were “entitled to all the privileges of Freemen of said Borough”); An Act for an 
Addition to George-town, in Montgomery County (Nov. 1784), reprinted in 1 LAWS OF 
MARYLAND, ch. 45 (William Kilty ed., Annapolis, 1799) (stating that the addition of land to an 
existing town was “entitled to . . . all the immunities, privileges and advantages, which do or shall 
appertain to the said town”); An Act for Dividing the Town of Concord, and Erecting a New 
Town There by the Name of Acton (May 28, 1735), in ACTS AND LAWS PASSED BY THE GREAT 
AND GENERAL COURT OR ASSEMBLY OF . . . MASSACHUSETTS-BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 499, 548 
(Boston, 1733) [hereinafter ACTS AND LAWS, MASSACHUSETTS-BAY] (vesting “Inhabitants” of 
new town “with all the Powers, Privileges and Immunities that the Inhabitants of the other Towns 
within this Province are or by Law ought to be vested with”); An Act for Erecting the Lower 
Plantation at Houssatonnock into a Township, by the Name of Sheffield (May 30, 1733), in ACTS 
AND LAWS, MASSACHUSETTS-BAY, supra, at 499 (Boston, 1733) (granting “the Inhabitants” of 
new town “all Powers, Privileges, Immunities and Advantages which other Towns in this 
Province by Law, have and enjoy”); An Act for Appointing a Town on the . . . West Side of 
Matchapungo River (Mar. 6, 1728), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF THE PRIVATE ACTS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 6, 6 (Newbern, N.C., 1794) (creating 
new town “with all the privileges and immunities, hereafter mentioned and expressed, for ever”); 
An Act for Establishing A Parish in Craven County by the Name of All Saints (Mar. 16, 1778), 
reprinted in PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, supra note 109, at 289 
(establishing a town and providing that “the inhabitants thereof shall use, exercise and enjoy all 
the rights, privileges and immunities, that the inhabitants of any other parish” possess “by the 
laws of this state”); An Act for Establishing a Town on the Lands of Willoughby Tebbs, in the 
County of Prince William (Nov. 27, 1788), in ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA., ch. 26, 14, 14 (Richmond, 1789) (“The purchasers of lots in the 
said town, so soon as they have built upon the same, . . . shall . . . have and enjoy, all the rights, 
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town residents, they had the same purposes: to give the residents of newly-
established towns the same rights as the inhabitants of other municipalities 
and to provide that newcomers received the same rights as established 
residents.  Moreover, it must have been assumed that anyone reading these 
laws would know the substance of these rights, which predated 
independence. 
In the same fashion as these laws recognizing the rights of municipal 
residents, states enacted naturalization statutes providing that new citizens 
would be treated equally with established ones.  A South Carolina statute in 
1789 granted citizenship to ten men and their descendants, giving them “all 
the rights, privileges and immunities which the naturel born citizens of the 
state . . . do enjoy.”195  General naturalization statutes in that state and 
others used similar language.  A Maryland law granted new residents who 
took an oath of citizenship “all the immunities, rights and privileges, of a 
natural born subject of this state,” except for a seven-year waiting period 
before the person was eligible for a “civil office” or elected position.196  
South Carolina required both an oath and a year’s residency before a 
person was “entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities” of state 
citizenship.197  None of these statutes defined “privileges” or “immunities,” 
or distinguished them from “rights.”  Rather, they extended all the benefits 
of citizenship equally to new citizens, at least once a waiting period was 
 
privileges, and immunities which the freeholders and inhabitants of other towns in this state, . . . 
hold and enjoy.”); An Act for Establishing a Town on the Lands of William Anderson in the 
County of Botetourt (Nov. 15, 1788), in ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ch. 16, 11, 11 (Richmond, 1789) (same provision); An Act for 
Establishing a Town, and An Inspection of Tobacco (Nov. 13, 1788), in ACTS PASSED AT A 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ch. 11, 8, 8 (Richmond, 1789) 
(same provision); An Act to Establish a Town in the County of Bourbon (Dec. 11, 1787), in ACTS 
PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ch. 91, 45, 45 
(Richmond, 1788) (same provision).  On colonial charters providing for incorporation of towns, 
see, e.g., The Charter of Carolina (1665), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 2767 (empowering the creation of ports “with such 
jurisdictions, privileges and franchises, unto the said ports belonging, as . . . shall seem most 
expedient”); The Charter of Maryland (1632), art. XIV, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 103, at 1683 (granting to Lord Baltimore and his heirs the right to 
create towns “with suitable Privileges and Immunities, according to the Merits of the Inhabitants, 
and Convenience of the Places.”).  On the English antecedents to charters for American towns, 
see Burrell, supra note 93, at 39–48; id. at 45 (“Generally, incorporation of a borough was the 
crown’s formal recognition of preexisting municipal privileges.”). 
195. An Act for Naturalizing Richard Wrainch, et al. (Mar. 13, 1789), in ACTS, ORDINANCES, 
AND RESOLVES, OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA 48, 48 
(Charleston, 1789). 
196. An Act for Naturalization (July 1779), in 1 THE LAWS OF MD. 362, 363 (Baltimore, 
Virgil Maxcy ed., Philip H. Nicklin & Co. 1799). 
197. An Act to Confer Certain Rights and Privileges on Aliens (Mar. 22, 1786), reprinted in 
PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, supra note 109, at 412. 
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satisfied. 
The opposite of naturalization also occurred in enactments stripping 
Loyalists of their citizenship rights in a state or community.  The town 
meeting of Worcester, Massachusetts, for example, passed several 
resolutions against Loyalists who had fled during the Revolution, including 
a declaration that that “this town cannot conceive it to be their duty, or their 
interest, ever to provide for the return of such ingrates, to naturalize them, 
or admit them to the privileges and immunities of citizens.”198 
Revolutionary literature was replete with complaints about the British 
administration denying Americans their “privileges,” often coupling that 
term with “rights,” “liberties,” or similar words.  In 1776, for example, the 
Continental Congress stated in a letter to the residents of Canada, “we have 
been forced” to take up arms “for the defence of our dearest privileges.”199  
The Declaration of Rights of the First Continental Congress resolved that 
the colonists were “entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immunities of 
free and natural-born subjects, within the realm of England,”200 as well as 
“to all the immunities and privileges granted & confirmed to them by royal 
charters.”201 
Several of the rebelling states employed these terms in their first 
constitutions to justify breaking ties with Great Britain.  New Hampshire’s 
Constitution, promulgated in 1776, declared that an independent 
government was justified by the “many grievous and oppressive acts of the 
British Parliament, depriving us of our native and constitutional Rights and 
Privileges.”202  In 1768, the Massachusetts House of Representatives 
informed the Earl of Shelburne, one of the king’s principal secretaries of 
state, that “exclusive of any consideration of their Charter,” the colonists 
were “entitled to the Rights and Privileges of the British constitution in 
common with their fellow subjects in Britain.”203  The assembly based this 
claim upon “the common law, . . . as well as sundry Acts of Parliament” 
dating to Edward III.204  Earlier, during the Stamp Act dispute in 1765, the 
 
198. THE WORCESTER SOCIETY OF ANTIQUITY, WORCESTER TOWN RECORDS: FROM 1753 
TO 1783, at 441 (Franklin P. Rice ed., 1882) (providing records of a town meeting that occurred 
on May 19, 1783). 
199. Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Canada (Jan. 24, 1776), reprinted in 4 J. 
CONT. CONG. 1774–1789, at 85, 85 (Worthington Chancey Ford et al. eds., 1904). 
200. Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774), reprinted in 
1 J. CONT. CONG. 1774–1789, at 63, 68 (Worthington Chancey Ford et al. eds., 1904). 
201. Id. at 69. 
202. N.H. CONST. of 1776, pmbl. 
203. Letter from the Massachusetts House of Representatives to the Earl of Shelburne (Jan. 
15, 1768), PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 14, 1768, at 1. 
204. Id.; see also Letter from the Massachusetts House of Representatives to the Earl of 
Chatham (Feb. 2, 1768), PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 14, 1768, at 2 (asserting that under the colonial 
charter the inhabitants were granted “all the rights, liberties, privileges and immunities of his 
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Virginia House of Burgesses resolved that the first colonists “brought with 
them, and transmitted to their posterity, . . . all the Liberties, Privileges, 
Franchises, and Immunities, that have at any Time been held, enjoyed, and 
possessed, by the people of Great Britain.”205  In addition, Virginia 
claimed that by their colonial charters the inhabitants of the colony were 
entitled to “all Liberties, Privileges, and Immunities” of those “abiding and 
born within the Realm of England.”206  During the same period, the 
Pennsylvania assembly resolved: “That the inhabitants of this Province are 
entitled to all the Liberties, Rights and Privileges of his Majesty’s Subjects 
in Great-Britain.”207  Most importantly, it was “the inherent Birth-right, 
and indubitable Privilege, of British Subject, to be taxed only by his own 
Consent, or that of his legal Representatives.”208  Shortly thereafter, the 
Stamp Act Congress resolved in 1765 that the colonists were “entitled to all 
the inherent rights and privileges of his natural born subjects born within 
the kingdom of Great Britain.”209 
In all of these writings, the operative words were highly general, but 
evidently their authors expected readers to comprehend their meaning.  
Even an American with relatively little education—i.e., most of the 
population at the time—would likely understand the basic elements of their 
rights as subjects or citizens.  Details were unimportant.  Americans 
demanded that the British government extend them all of the rights of 
subjects in England. 
3. Blackstone’s Depiction of the Rights of Subjects 
The most-recognized authority on the rights of subjects was Blackstone, 
who alternately used the terms rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities 
to describe the protections afforded British citizens by their constitution.  
His depiction of the British constitution was conventional and widely 
 
natural subjects, born within the realm”). 
205. Virginia Resolves (May 30, 1765), reprinted in 10 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF 
BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1761–1765, at 360 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1907). 
206. Id. 
207. Resolves of the Pennsylvania Assembly on the Stamp Act (September 21, 1765), 
reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT 
CRISIS, 1764–1766, at 51, 51 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959). 
208. Id. 
209. Resolves of the Stamp Act Congress (Oct. 19, 1765), reprinted in JOURNAL OF THE 
FIRST CONGRESS OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES 27, 28 (New York, E. Winchester 1845); see, 
e.g., Resolutions of the Boston Town Meeting (Sept. 13, 1768) (granting, via charter, colonial 
inhabitants “all liberties and immunities of free and natural subjects, . . . as if they and every of 
them were born within the realm of England”).  Other state constitutions, such as New York’s in 
1777, condemned “the many tyrannical and oppressive usurpations of the King and Parliament of 
Great Britain on the rights and liberties of the people of the American colonies,” with no 
substantive difference from those complaining about loss of “privileges.”  N.Y. CONST. of 1777, 
pmbl. 
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accepted on both sides of the Atlantic. 
“The absolute rights of every Englishman, . . . which, taken in a political 
and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties,” Blackstone wrote, 
were “founded on nature and reason.”210  Blackstone organized the 
absolute rights into three divisions.  First, there was “[t]he right of personal 
security,” that is, “a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, 
his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.”211  Second, “the law of 
England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals,” 
which meant “the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or 
removing one’s person to whatsoever place of one’s own inclination may 
direct; without imprisonment or restraint.”212  Moreover, this liberty had 
“[a] natural and regular consequence, . . . that every Englishman may claim 
a right to abide in his own country so long as he pleases; and not to be 
driven from it unless by the sentence of the law.”213  Third, there was “the 
sacred and inviolable rights of private property,”214 “which consists in the 
free use, enjoyment, and disposal” of a person’s “acquisitions, without any 
control or diminishment, save only by the laws of the land.”215 
The term “absolute rights”216 may suggest to a modern reader that these 
liberties could not be altered even by legislation enacted for the public 
good.  Blackstone meant no such thing: all of these absolute rights could be 
regulated and defined by Parliament.  Every right, including to life itself, 
was subject to control “by due process of law,”217 which referred to two 
things.  First, rights could be limited by standing laws applicable to 
everyone—“the constitution is an utter stranger to any arbitrary power of 
killing or maiming the subject without express warrant of law.”218  Second, 
the application of these established rules, whether derived from the 
common law or parliamentary action, could only occur “by due process of 
law,” which required regular judicial procedures.219  This was one of the 
most important concessions from King John in Magna Carta.  “To bereave 
a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or 
trial,” Blackstone wrote, “would be so gross and notorious an act of 
 
210. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *123.  
211. Id. at *125. 
212. Id. at *130. 
213. Id. at *133. 
214. Id. at *135. 
215. Id. at *134.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1220–22 (1992) (discussing how Blackstone used the terms 
“privileges” and “immunities” to describe various entitlements). 
216. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *123. 
217. Id. at *130. 
218. Id. at *129. 
219. Id. at *130. 
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despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the 
whole kingdom.”220 
 The absolute rights themselves were but a “dead letter,” Blackstone 
continued, without a means “to secure their actual enjoyment.”221  To 
assure that “the three great and primary rights, of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property” were respected, “certain other 
auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject” had been “established” by 
British law.  By his count, there were five such subordinate rights 
recognized by the constitution.  All were privileges or immunities of 
subjects.  They were not natural rights in themselves; rather, they were 
codified concessions wrested from the crown that enabled subjects to 
realize the liberties they were entitled to by natural law.222 
The first subordinate right identified by Blackstone was the “[t]he 
constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament.”223  It was through 
Parliament that the people prevented the executive from “enact[ing] 
tyrannical laws, and execut[ing] them in a tyrannical manner,” because 
“where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the 
former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power, as may 
tend to the subversion of it’s own independence, and therewith of the 
liberty of the subject.”224 
The second subordinate right consisted of limits on “the king’s 
prerogative” powers—his ability to act without legislative assent—that 
constrained the monarch “by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is 
impossible he should exceed them without the consent of the people.”225  
Prerogative powers could threaten the liberties of the subjects, for example, 
if the King tried to expand his traditional sources of revenue by intruding 
on Parliament’s control over taxes and appropriations. 
The third subordinate right was “that of applying to the court of justice 
for redress of injuries.”226  This was the essence of Magna Carta’s promise 
that the people could not be “put out of the protection and benefit of the 
laws, but according to the law of the land.”227  The king may have been 
entitled to “erect new courts of justice; but then they must proceed 
according to the old established forms of the common law.”228  Should 
 
220. Id. at *131–32. 
221. Id. at *136.  
222. See id. at *123–24 (describing origin of British rights in various statutes exacting 
concessions from the crown). 
223. Id. at 136. 
224. Id. at *142. 
225. Id. at *137. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at *138.  
228. Id. 
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“the ordinary course of law” prove “too defective to reach” an “uncommon 
injury,” “or infringement of the rights beforementioned,”229 a citizen could 
exercise a fourth right, “petitioning the king, or either house of parliament, 
for the redress of grievances.”230 
The fifth subordinate right was very different from the other “auxiliary 
right[s] of the subject,” as it consisted “of having arms for their defence, 
suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law.”231 
Even though Blackstone and most other Anglo-American constitutional 
commentators regarded the absolute liberties of the people as grounded in 
natural law, they nonetheless were “defined by these several statutes.”232  
Those enactments expressed the basic rights of the people, which were 
none other “than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not 
required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or 
else those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of 
the natural liberties so given up by individuals.”233 
The statutes Blackstone referenced were not commonplace acts of 
Parliament, nor were they rights that conferred minor advantages.  Rather, 
Blackstone said that they consisted of the “great charter of liberties,” 
principally Magna Carta in 1215 and “subsequent corroborating statutes,” 
the Petition of Right extracted from Charles I in 1628, the Habeas Corpus 
Act enacted under Charles II in 1679, the Bill of Rights passed by 
Parliament in 1689, and the Act of Settlement of 1701.234  Other treatises 
on the British constitution likewise equated the rights of Britons with these 
statutes, sometimes adding others to the list, such as several laws 
defining—and limiting—the crime of treason.  Works such as British 
Liberties, or the Free-born Subject’s Inheritance, published in 1766, 
consisted largely of commentaries on these milestone enactments.235 
Although ultimately laws like Magna Carta were intended to preserve 
personal freedoms, and they did recognize certain individual rights, for the 
 
229. Id. at *139. 
230. Id. at *138–39. 
231. Id. at *139. 
232. Id. at *125; see also Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1, cc. 1 (1638), reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF 
THE REALM 23, 23–24 (London, G. Eyre & A. Strahan 1819); Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. 2, cc. 
2 (1679), reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra, at 935–38; Bill of Rights, 1 Gul. & 
Mar., Sess. 2, cc. 2 (1688), reprinted in 6 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra, at 142–45; Act of 
Settlement, art. IV, XII & XIII Gul. III., c. 2 (1701), reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM, 
supra, at 636–38.  
233. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *125. 
234. Id. at *123. 
235. BRITISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECTS INHERITANCE (London, H. Woodfall 
& W. Strahan 1766); see also A GUIDETO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF 
ENGLISHMEN (London, J. Williams & W. Bingley 1771) (discussing statutes ranging from the 
Magna Carta to the Act of Settlement). 
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most part they established the powers of Parliament, the supremacy of its 
statutes under English law, and the independence of the judiciary.  These 
laws served “the principal aim of society,” Blackstone wrote, “to protect 
individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which are vested in 
them by the immutable laws of nature.”236  Over the course of English 
history, there had been occasions when these natural rights were 
“depressed by overbearing and tyrannical princes,”237 yet “the vigour of 
our free constitution has always delivered the nation from these 
embarrassments.”238  That delivery did not come by courts declaring laws 
unconstitutional, but by popular resistance to royal rule that resulted in the 
adoption of additional written protections.  Most of all, English liberties 
were thought secured by the rise of parliamentary power as a 
counterweight to arbitrary monarchical rule. 
4. The Privileges of Political Representation and Judicial Protection 
“[T]he first Fundamental Privilege” of the people, according to 
numerous English authorities throughout the century, was choosing 
“Members to represent them in Parliament,” even if this glossed over the 
fact that only a small minority of the adult populace was eligible to vote 
due to property requirements and exclusion of women from the polls.239  
The absence of American representation in Parliament lay at the heart of 
revolutionary complaints, for as the Continental Congress claimed, “the 
foundation of English liberty” was the “right in the people to participate in 
their legislative council.”240  The English were “a Free People,” the 
Connecticut General Assembly wrote in a 1764 protest to Parliament 
against the Stamp Act, precisely because they held “this general Privilege, 
that ‘NO LAWS CAN BE MADE OR ABROGATED, WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT, BY 
THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT.’”241  Numerous authorities 
 
236. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *120. 
237. Id. at *123. 
238. Id. 
239. HUMPHREY MACKWORTH, AN ABSTRACT OF A TREATISE, INTITULED, FREE 
PARLIAMENTS 3 (London, John Nutt 4th. ed. 1705) (Mackworth was a knight and member of the 
House of Commons). 
240. Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774), reprinted in 
1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 199, at 68. 
241. Reasons Why the British Colonies in America Should Not be Charged with Internal 
Taxes, by Authority of Parliament (Hartford, 1764) [hereinafter Reasons Why], reprinted in 12 
THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 653, 653 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., 
Hartford, Press of the Case 1881) (pamphlet on the taxation of British colonies in America); see 
also 2 THE FITCH PAPERS: CORRESPONDENCE AND DOCUMENTS 307 (Connecticut Historical 
Society, 1918–1920) (noting that the assembly ordered Gov. Thomas Fitch to prepare and 
transmit the Stamp Act protest to Parliament). 
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likewise referred to voting as a privilege.242 
Paralleling the importance of legislative representation was “[t]he great 
and fundamental privilege of trials by juries,” Thomas Mortimer claimed in 
a 1780 tract.243  Blackstone called trial by jury “the glory of the English 
law,” and “the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy,” 
one that had “secured the just liberties of this nation for a long succession 
of ages.”244  Americans viewed the institution as indispensable to popular 
control of government—and hence home rule for the colonies—because 
juries effectively controlled the operation of the law by their authority to 
issue general verdicts that resolved both the factual and legal issues in the 
case.  Forrest McDonald has written that on an “everyday” basis American 
“juries were the government, and it was upon them that the safety of all 
rights to liberty and property depended.”245  The New York Assembly sent 
a petition to George III in 1775, declaring in part that transporting 
Americans outside their colonies for trials without juries in admiralty courts 
was “grievous and destructive of our rights and privileges.”246  Trial in the 
vicinage—the place where the crime occurred—was “the grand security 
and birthright of Englishmen.”247  Among the specific assertions of the 
Continental Congress was that the colonies were “entitled to the common 
law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege 
of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that 
law.”248  In resolving to take up arms against the British in 1775, one of the 
specific grievances cited by the Continental Congress was “depriving us of 
the accustomed and inestimable privilege of trial by jury.”249  The 
Declaration of Independence accused the British of “depriv[ing] of the 
inestimable privilege of trial by jury,” and “transporting us beyond Seas to 
be tried for pretended offences.”250 
 
242. On voting as a privilege, see Natelson, supra note 18, at 1156–57 (“Suffrage and 
representation were characterized as ‘privileges’ in state constitutions, the state ratifying 
conventions, and in publications such as THE FEDERALIST.”). 
243. THOMAS MORTIMER, THE ELEMENTS OF COMMERCE, POLITICS AND FINANCES 450 
(London, R. Baldwin 1780). 
244. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 125, at *379. 
245. MCDONALD, supra note 104, at 40 (emphasis added). 
246. Petition of New York General Assembly to George III (March 25, 1775), PA. GAZETTE, 
Apr. 26, 1775, at 2. 
247. Id. 
248. Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774), reprinted in 
1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 199, at 69. 
249. Declaration of the Causes and Necessities for Taking Up Arms (July 6, 1775), reprinted 
in 2 J. CONT. CONG. 1774–1789, 128, 132 (Worthington Chancey Ford et al. eds., 1904).  
250. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, paras. 20–21 (U.S. 1776).  For other references 
to trial by jury as a “privilege,” see, e.g., An Act to raise, by voluntary Enlistment, four hundred 
and fifty Men, for completing the Quota of Troops belonging to this State, in the Service of the 
United States §16 (June 25, 1781), in ACTS OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
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The steady application of standing rules by courts was essential to 
preserving the rule of law, according to Blackstone and many other jurists.  
The various procedures associated with judicial processes frequently were 
termed privileges.  Most important of all was the one inserted in the 
Constitution, habeas corpus, a common feature of state constitutions and 
widely referred to as among the most important of privileges: “The 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”251  This “great and efficacious writ,” Blackstone explained, authorized 
a common law court to determine whether the government illegally 
detained a person, and if so, to command the prisoner’s release.252  
Numerous other judicial processes were also routinely termed privileges.253 
5. Other Substantive Privileges 
Other liberties described as privileges or immunities in the eighteenth 
century were substantive protections of individuals, including ones that a 
number of writers considered natural rights.  This is apparent from some of 
the examples already given, such as Blackstone’s list of British “rights.”  
Consider freedom of press, for example.  Prominent writers, such as Noah 
 
STATE OF NEW-JERSEY 205, 210 (1784) (“every Person shall have the same Privilege of Appeal 
and Jury”); AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 161, at 110 (“the privilege of being 
tried by their peers [is] enjoyed by the meanest subject.”); AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC; STATING 
AND CONSIDERING THE OBJECTIONS TO THE QUEBEC BILL 34 (London, T. Payne & M. 
Hingeston 1774) (“our Privilege of trial by jury”); OBADIAH HULME, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON 
THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 169 (London, Edward Dilly & Charles Dilly 1771) (“this great 
privilege of the English people of trial by Jury”); HENRY FIELDING, A CHARGE DELIVERED TO 
THE GRAND JURY AT THE SESSIONS OF THE PEACE HELD FOR THE CITY AND LIBERTY OF 
WESTMINSTER, &C. ON THURSDAY THE 29TH OF JUNE, 1749, at 15 (Dublin, George Faulkner 
1749) (“[T]he Subject” had “that great Privilege of being indicted and tryed by a Jury of their 
Countrymen.”); Thomas Salmon, The Trial of John Gibbons . . . for High Treason (July 18, 
1651), in A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE STATE TRIALS 240, 241 (London, William Mears 1735) 
(“the Privilege of a Trial by a Jury, according to the antient Laws of England”). 
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
252. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 125, at *131.  Habeas corpus was frequently referred to as a 
privilege in early constitutions, writings, and public statements.  See Natelson, supra note 18, at 
1163–64 & nn.238–41 (acknowledging that Habeas Corpus was deemed a privilege). 
253. According to one modern account, “the procedures repeatedly referred to as ‘privileges’” 
included trials, trials by jury, challenges to empaneling biased jurors, appeal processes, 
procedures granting criminal defendants the same access to witnesses and counsel that the 
prosecution enjoyed, confrontation by an accused of the accusers and of the witnesses against 
him, the opportunity to call for evidence on one’s own behalf, and the limitation on forfeiture to 
the life of the criminal.  Natelson, supra note 18, at 1164–65; see, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. 
LVII (“This is not intended to exclude any person from that inherent privilege of every freeman, 
the liberty to plead his own cause.”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI (“That all criminals shall be 
admitted to the same Privileges of Witnesses and Counsel, as their Prosecutors are or shall be 
entitled to.”).   
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Webster, considered the right to publish a “fundamental privilege.”254  
Decades earlier, the great opposition writer Algernon Sidney similarly 
described freedom of the press as “one of the most fundamental Privileges 
of the Subject.”255  When introducing the Bill of Rights in Congress, 
Madison extolled “the freedom of the press and rights of conscience” as 
“those choicest privileges of the people.”256  The New Jersey Constitution 
of 1776 provided “[t]hat no Person shall . . . be deprived of the inestimable 
Privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a Manner agreeable to the 
Dictates of his own Conscience.”257  It also guaranteed adherents of any 
“Protestant sect . . . every Privilege and Immunity, enjoyed by . . . their 
Fellow Subjects.”258  The sanctity of the home from unwanted intrusions 
was closely associated with the natural liberty to possess property, yet the 
right often was called a privilege or immunity.  Blackstone said that “the 
law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a 
man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated 
with impunity.”259  In 1761, James Otis argued in a Massachusetts court 
against the constitutionality of writs of assistance—general search warrants 
issued without “good Grounds of suspicion”—because they infringed on 
 
254. NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 31–32 (Phila., Prichard & Hall 1787). 
255. 1 ALGERNON SIDNEY, OF THE USE AND ABUSE OF PARLIAMENTS 127 (London, F. 
Freeman 1745).  
256. James Madison, 1 ANNALS CONG. 453 (June 8, 1789).  On other references to liberty of 
press as a privilege, see, e.g., JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; OR, AN 
ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 295 (London, G.G.J., J. Robinson & J. Murray 1790) 
(stating, “the freedom of the press” was “a privilege . . . finally established”); JOSEPH 
CAVENDISH, THE ARGUMENTS OF THE TWO GENTLEMEN, WHO WERE OF COUNCIL FOR JOSEPH 
CAVENDISH, ON HIS TRIAL FOR PUBLISHING A LIBEL AGAINST THE LATE LORD T-N 22 (Dublin, 
1783) (referencing “the liberty of the press; that invaluable privilege”); FRANCIS MASERES, AN 
ENQUIRY INTO THE EXTENT OF THE POWER OF JURIES, ON TRIALS OF INDICTMENTS OR 
INFORMATIONS, FOR PUBLISHING SEDITIOUS, OR OTHER CRIMINAL WRITINGS 3 (London, J. 
Debrett 1785) (recognizing “that most valuable privilege of English subjects, the Liberty of the 
Press”); THOMAS ROCH, THE CANTERBURY PATRIOT: OR, THE LATE MAYOR’S NEW MODE OF 
DEFENDING LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE PRESS 48, 55, 95, 98 (London, T. 
Smith 1773) (acknowledging the “privilege of the press”); Junius, Letter No. LXI (Oct. 17, 1771), 
in 2 THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS 281, 284  (London, Henry S. Woodfall 1772) [hereinafter LETTERS 
OF JUNIUS] (“The liberty of the press is, after all, a valuable privilege.”); Speech of John Hynd 
Cotton, House of Commons (Feb. 3, 1737), in 10 HISTORY & PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE PRESENT TIME 37, 37 (London, Richard Chandler 
1742) (“Whigs . . . esteemed the Liberty of the Press to be the most valuable Privilege of a free 
People.”); The Trial of Mr. Richard Francklin (1731) (argument of Francklin’s counsel), in 9 
FRANCIS HARGRAVE, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS 255, 267 (London, T. Wright 
1778)  (“[T]he Liberty of the Press . . . hath been always esteemed as a great Privilege, and of 
great Advantage to this Nation.”). 
257. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII. 
258. Id. at art. XIX. 
259. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223 (Oxford, 1769). 
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“the Priviledge of House,” one of “the fundamental Principles of Law.”260 
Freedom of speech also frequently was termed a privilege, as when 
Blackstone wrote that members of Parliament were afforded “privilege of 
speech” by statute as one of the “liberties of the people.”261  In this context, 
the right of speech was a peculiar liberty, because eighteenth-century law in 
England and America gave very weak legal protections for speech of the 
citizenry—and scarcely better for the press.262  The safeguards for speech 
were primarily indirect, such as the Constitution’s requirement that the 
crime of treason against the United States consist of acts rather than 
words—“in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, 
giving them Aid and Comfort.”263  Or free expression was allowed, but 
restricted to specifically authorized channels, the most important of which 
was the petition for redress of grievances—Blackstone’s fourth subordinate 
right, referred to variously by writers as a privilege or natural right of 
citizens.  Junius chided the government in 1770 for creating an atmosphere 
that “threatens to punish the subject for exercising a privilege, hitherto 
undisputed, of petitioning the Crown.”264  A political association in Great 
Britain calling for parliamentary reform in 1781 urged that “[t]he right to 
petition Parliament for a redress of grievances, is a fundamental right of the 
British people,” the exercise of “which is prohibited by no positive statute,” 
and thus could not “be unlawful.”265 
 
260. The Writs of Assistance Case (Mass. Bay Super. Prov. Ct. 1761) (argument of counsel, 
James Otis), in 1 JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE 
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 
AND 1772, at 469, 471 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1865) (John Adams’ contemporaneous 
notes of the case).  
261. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *160.  
262. See Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From 
the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century¸ 34 WILL. MITCH. L. REV. 773, 783–803 
(2008) (describing early legal protections for freedom of speech).  Nine states protected freedom 
of press in their new constitutions, but only Pennsylvania covered freedom of speech.  See id. at 
787. 
263. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see Jay, supra note 262, at 789. 
264. Junius, Letter No. XXXVII (Mar. 19, 1790), in LETTERS OF JUNIUS, supra note 256, at 
183. 
265. Address of the Committee of Association for the County of York (Jan. 4, 1781), in 
SOUND REASON AND SOLID ARGUMENT FOR A REFORM IN PARLIAMENT; AND THE ABOLITION 
OF BRIBERY, CORRUPTION, ROTTEN BOROUGHS, AND OTHER ABUSES 72, 72 (London, D.I. 
Eaton c. 1795) [hereinafter SOUND REASON AND SOLID ARGUMENT].  On other references to 
speech as a privilege for legislators, see, e.g., Junius, Letter No. XLIV (Apr. 22, 1771), in 
LETTERS OF JUNIUS, supra note 256, at 232 n.* (“[I]n all the addresses of new-appointed 
Speakers to the Sovereign, the utmost privilege they demand is liberty of speech.”); 5 DAVID 
HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR TO THE 
REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 225 (London, T. Cadell 1789) (paraphrasing Peter Wentworth, a leading 
Puritan member of Parliament in 1576, stating “that freedom of speech in that house [of 
Parliament was] a privilege, so useful both to sovereign and subject”); FRANCIS PLOWDEN & 
JURA ANGLORUM, THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN 456 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1792) (“Some 
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As Leonard Levy has written, the eighteenth-century witnessed a 
transformation in the popular understanding of free expression in both 
Great Britain and America.  While the law formally continued to regard 
freedom of speech as a “privilege of parliamentarians,” increasingly it was 
referred to in political writings and declarations as a “personal right of 
citizens . . . based on natural rights.”266  Regardless of the limited legal 
protections for free expression, American republicans agreed with John 
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, the authors of the famed Cato’s Letters, 
who wrote more than fifty years before the Revolution, that “all Liberty 
depends upon Freedom of Speech, and Freedom of Writing, within the 
Bounds of Manners and Discretion.”267  Yet Trenchard and Gordon also 
described free speech as a “sacred Privilege . . . so essential to free 
Governments.”268  A Philadelphia newspaper published an essay by one 
Tacitus in 1767, who felt “fortunate as to exist in these blessed Times, 
when we are happy in the unlimited Enjoyment of that most precious 
Privilege ‘of thinking what we please, and of speaking what we think.’”269 
By the time the Constitution was written, many Americans believed that 
the freedoms of press and speech were natural rights.  Patrick Henry 
complained about the absence of protections for the press in the proposed 
Constitution, telling the Virginia ratifying convention that publishing was 
 
however of the more notorious privileges of the members of either house are privilege of speech, 
of person, of their domestics, and of their lands and goods.”); JOHN TRUSLER, A CONCISE VIEW 
OF THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTE LAW OF ENGLAND 24 (London, W. Nicoll c. 1781) (stating 
that “speech” was one of the “principal . . . privileges” of Parliament); 9 THE PARLIAMENTARY 
OR CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 102 (London, T. Osborn & W. Sandby 1753) 
(quoting Francis Seymour, member of Parliament in 1640, stating that “the greatest Privilege is 
Liberty of Speech”).  On other references to petitioning as a right or privilege, see, e.g., London 
Corresponding Society, Conclusory Address, in THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE LONDON 
CORRESPONDING SOCIETY REVISED AND CORRECTED 82, 82 (London, London Corresp. Soc’y 
1795) (“Has it not always been . . . the right of Britons to petition for a Redress of their 
Grievances?”); SAMUEL HORSLEY, A SERMON, PREACHED BEFORE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL AND 
TEMPORAL 21 (Jan. 30, 1793) (London, T. Payne & Son 1793) (noting that “the private Citizen” 
possessed “the Right of petition for redress of grievances”); JOHANN WILHELM VON 
ARCHENHOLZ, A PICTURE OF ENGLAND: CONTAINING A DESCRIPTION OF THE LAWS, CUSTOMS 
AND MANNERS OF ENGLAND 29 (Dublin, P. Byrne 1790) (describing the “privilege of public 
remonstrances”); Address of the Committee of Association for the County of York (Jan. 4, 1781), 
in SOUND REASON AND SOLID ARGUMENT, supra, at 72 (“The right to petition Parliament for a 
redress of grievances, is a fundamental right of the British people.”); THE HISTORY OF THE WAR 
IN AMERICA, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES 400 (Dublin, Co. of Booksellers 
1779) (“All of the assemblies on the continent . . . asserted the right of the subject to the petition 
for the redress of grievances.”). 
266. LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM 
MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 292 (1993). 
267. 3 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 304 (London, W. Wilkins 
et al. 1724). 
268. 1 id. at 97. 
269. Tacitus, PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 23, 1767, at 2. 
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among “the rights of human nature” and a “palladium of our liberties.”270  
It was not uncommon to refer to freedom of press and speech as being 
privileges based on natural law.  A Baltimore essayist named Uncus wrote 
in 1787 that “liberty of the press” was “what the people . . .  look upon as a 
privilege, with which every inhabitant is born;—a right which Nature, and 
Nature’s God, has given.”271  A supporter of ratification, Uncus defended 
the absence of a press clause in the Constitution on the ground that it was 
“too sacred to require being mentioned.”272  Popular attitudes like these 
translated into the refusal of juries to convict fellow citizens for criticizing 
the government.273 
6. Political Rights as Privileges and Immunities 
Interpreting Article IV as protecting all of the rights afforded by a state 
to its citizens does produce one seemingly anomalous result.  If states must 
treat outsiders exactly as they would their own, then that would apply to 
voting and qualifications for state offices.  As mentioned, voting commonly 
was referred to as a privilege of the people.274  Recall authorities 
proclaiming that voting for representatives in Parliament was “the first 
Fundamental Privilege of the Commons of England.”275  Gouverneur 
Morris made a similar point when proposing that a person must be a citizen 
of the United States for fourteen years before being eligible for the Senate.  
Foreigners visiting the United States had numerous “privileges,” he said, 
but there were necessary limits, such as “being eligible to the great offices 
of Government.”276  The Convention agreed to a nine-year residency 
requirement for Senators, and seven years for Representatives, while also 
limiting the presidency to “natural born” citizens.277  Article IV, by 
contrast, made no distinction among privileges—it covered “all” of them. 
Would nonresidents then be entitled under Article IV to cast a ballot in 
another state’s election or stand for election there?  Or to hold office?  (The 
 
270. Patrick Henry, Remarks at Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1778), in 3 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 43, at 449. 
271. Uncus, MD. ADVERTISER (Baltimore), Nov. 8, 1787, at 2. 
272. Id. 
273. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: 
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 46 (2000) (stating that 
“[g]rand juries refused to indict; and petit juries refused to convict” Americans on seditious libel 
charges). 
 274. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
275. MACKWORTH, supra note 239, at 186. 
276. Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 9, 1787), 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 238 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).  
277. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing the seven years’ residency requirement for 
Representatives); id. at art. I § 3, cl. 3 (establishing the nine years’ residency requirement for 
Senators); id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (requiring that the President be “natural born”). 
ORIGINS OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2013  10:46 AM 
2013] Origins of the Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship 49 
mainstream answer since at least the mid-nineteenth century has been 
resoundingly no.278)  During the Confederation, some states enacted 
citizenship requirements for voting and holding public offices.279  Whether 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to override those 
provisions is not entirely clear as the record is so skimpy, and as a practical 
matter it never was more than a theoretical issue, if that.  In what was likely 
the first general account of the privileges of citizenship, David Ramsay 
wrote in 1789 that “oaths of fidelity to the states were respectively 
administered soon after the declaration of independence, to all above a 
certain age.  By these oaths, a compact was established between the state 
and the individuals; and those who took them acquired or confirmed their 
citizenship,” and thereby “acquired a right to the privileges and protection 
of citizens.”280  Ramsay also contended that “[c]itizenship confers a right 
of voting at elections, and many other privileges not enjoyed by those who 
are no more than inhabitants.”281 
And therein lay the problem.  Thomas Burke, a North Carolina delegate 
to the Continental Congress, worried in 1777 that under the proposed 
Articles “the Inhabitants of our Neighboring States [would] have the 
privileges of Citizens in ours [to] insist upon the right of voting for 
Members of Our Legislature.”282  Burke regarded this result as a “political 
absurdity,” urging that an amendment was necessary to avoid this result.283  
Nevertheless, North Carolina agreed to the Articles, perhaps realizing that 
there were plenty of ways for states to assure that political privileges were 
 
278. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (“It has not 
been suggested, however, that state citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to 
distinguish among persons.  Suffrage, for example, always has been understood to be tied to an 
individual’s identification with a particular State. . . . The same is true as to qualification for an 
elective office of the State.”); see also John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1417 & nn.128–29 (1992). 
279. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIV (stating that voters must take oath or affirmation 
of allegiance); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXV (requiring that holders of “any office of trust or 
profit” take an “oath of support and fidelity to this State”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VII (same 
as Georgia); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XII (stating that legislators and holders of “any office or 
place of trust” must “take an oath to the State”); id. at art. XL (adding that a “foreigner” who 
takes oath of allegiance is deemed a citizen after one year); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVI 
(requiring oath for holders of “any office or to any place of trust, civil or military”); An Act to 
Confer Certain Rights and Privileges on Aliens, § 1 (Mar. 22, 1786), reprinted in PUBLIC LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, supra note 109, at 4 (establishing that aliens could become 
citizens after residing in the state one year and taking an oath or affirmation of allegiance). 
280. DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNERS OF ACQUIRING THE CHARACTER 
AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN 5 (Charleston, 1789). 
281. Id. at 3. 
282. Thomas Burke, Notes on the Proposed Articles (Nov. 1777), reprinted in AMERICA’S 
FOUNDING CHARTERS: PRIMARY DOCUMENTS OF COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ERA 
GOVERNANCE 869 (Jon L. Wakelyn ed., 2006). 
283. Id. 
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not abused by noncitizens.  The problem would be avoided by residency 
requirements for voting or office-seeking, which were common among the 
states at the time, and thereafter, including North Carolina.284  For 
example, South Carolina’s constitution imposed a ten years’ residency 
requirement for election as governor or commander-in-chief, five years 
residency for election to its privy council and senate, and three years to the 
house; voters must have been in residence for one year.285  Maryland 
imposed residency requirements varying from one to three years for certain 
civil and political offices.286  States also typically required voters to be 
property owners and taxpayers in the state.287 
A person who lived for several years in a state, owned property there, 
and paid local taxes, would almost certainly be eligible for citizenship.  If 
not, that person still would have forged substantial enough ties to the state 
to at least be considered a competent elector.  In eighteenth-century 
thinking, office-holding was reserved for those with substantial and 
 
284. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. V (establishing one year residency requirement for Senate 
election); id. at art. VI (establishing one year residency requirement for House of Commons 
election); id. at art. XV (establishing five year residency requirement to be Governor).  These 
residency requirements persisted into the nineteenth century and were recognized by courts.  See 
Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92–93 (1827) (“[The Privileges and Immunities Clause] 
is necessarily limited and qualified, for it cannot be pretended that a citizen of Rhode Island 
coming into this State to live, is ipso facto entitled to the full privileges of a citizen if any term of 
residence is prescribed as preliminary to the exercise of political or municipal rights.”).  The same 
would be true with regard to the right of jury service.  In Ex Parte Virginia, Justice Field wrote in 
dissent that “it was never contended that jury duty or jury service was included” among the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship.  100 U.S. 339, 366 (1879).  However, juries traditionally 
were drawn from the vicinage as a matter of due process, which would have prevented 
noncitizens without residential ties to the community from serving.  See Steven A. Engel, The 
Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1660 (2000) (“Our 
law always has presumed that the defendant would be tried by representatives of the vicinage 
. . . .”). 
285. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XII (establishing seven year residency requirement for senate 
election); id. at art. XIII (requiring that voters for senate and house of representatives have been 
“a resident and inhabitant” for one year, own property and pay taxes; three years’ residency was 
required for election to the House); see DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1 (establishing two year 
residency requirement to vote for president or legislators); GA. CONST. of 1777, art. IX 
(establishing six months’ residency requirement for voting); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 222, § 6 
(establishing one year residency requirement for voting). 
286. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II (establishing one year residency in county requirement and 
property ownership requirement for voting rights and election to house of delegates); id. at art. VI  
(requiring the same for senators); id. at art. XXVI (requiring three years of state residency and 
property ownership for election to council to the Governor); id. at art. XLII (requiring county 
residency and property ownership to vote for sheriffs). 
287. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1 (requiring tax payment to vote for Governor 
or legislators); GA. CONST. of 1777, art. IX (requiring property ownership and tax liability for 
voting); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II (establishing property requirements for voting and office-
holding); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art.  XII (requiring property qualification for Senate election); id. 
at art. XIII (requiring voters for Senate and House of Representatives to own property and pay 
taxes, and requiring property ownership for House election). 
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permanent connections to the state, and long-time residents with property 
and who paid taxes would surely qualify.288  One example is John 
Dickinson, who played a prominent role in drafting the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Articles.  Dickinson owned extensive properties 
in Pennsylvania and Delaware, and in the Confederation period he 
alternated between holding high offices in each, including simultaneously 
serving as President of the two states.  At different times, he represented 
both states in the Continental Congress.289 
No case ever arose testing the political rights of noncitizens under the 
clause.  Early courts reached opposite conclusions about the question, but 
only in dicta.  For example, Justice Washington in Corfield thought that 
“the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or 
constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised,” was a privilege of 
citizenship protected by Article IV.290  By contrast, an influential Maryland 
decision concluded that the clause did not protect “the right of election, the 
right of holding offices, [or] the right of being elected.”291  At a time when 
people did not relocate often or travel back and forth between states with 
frequency, the likelihood of the issue surfacing was next to nothing.  This 
perhaps explains why the Framers chose not to create an exception to the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause for voting and office-holding, and why 
Burke’s concern did not produce any recorded stir of opposition.  Just as 
they chose to jettison the Article’s exception for “paupers, vagabonds and 
fugitives,” the Framers may have decided the states had ample means to 
deal with the issue without tainting the ideal stated in the clause: 
unqualified equality.  Then again, perhaps they did not even consider the 
issue—Burke’s comment came a decade before the Constitution, and no 
one else seemed to have been concerned.292 
In summary, the words “subjects” and “citizens” meant the people of a 
 
288. The eligibility of a longtime, property-owning, tax-paying resident to vote is evident 
from the various constitutional provisions for exercising the franchise.  See supra notes 284–87. 
289. See 6 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 567–68 (noting Dickinson’s various offices in 
Delaware and Pennsylvania); MILTON EMBICK FLOWER, JOHN DICKINSON: CONSERVATIVE 
REVOLUTIONARY 211 (1983) (“[F]or two months [in 1782] Dickinson was president of both 
Pennsylvania and Delaware.”). 
290. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
291. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1797), rev’d on other grounds, 
3 H. & McH at 576 (Md. Ct. App. 1800).   
292. Natelson argues that suffrage was a “privilege,” but “not a privilege incident to 
citizenship.”  Natelson, supra note 18, at 1157.  He reasons that the franchise could not be a 
privilege of citizenship inasmuch as no state allowed all of its citizens to vote.  But that was not a 
distinction anyone made at the time the Constitution was being considered, and the explanation 
does not fit well with the relationship between citizenship and voting.  States had varying 
qualifications for suffrage, but they all required voters to be either citizens or residents with 
permanent attachment to the state. 
ORIGINS OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2013  10:46 AM 
52 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  45 
state, either those who were born there or who had been granted that status.  
Although the privileges and immunities of citizens certainly included all of 
the legal mechanisms associated with preserving natural rights, they also 
encompassed more prosaic advantages, especially those associated with 
trade.  In ordinary language at the time, a reference to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens or subjects meant all of the advantages that flowed 
from being a member of the polity.  American republican ideology added 
an element not present in British constitutionalism: forbidding special 
privileges for classes of people.  Republican citizenship was premised on 
equality, David Ramsay emphasized: “Each citizen of a free state contains, 
within himself, as much of the common sovereignty as another.”293 
The disputes of the 1780s that were the immediate focus of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause were not over the types of rights that 
underlay revolutionary demands or those described by Blackstone.  Instead, 
they involved discriminatory trade regulations.  That the proponents of the 
Constitution would view such biases as denials of privileges and 
immunities of citizenship is proof of a basic point: that the clause was 
intended to give Americans the same benefits they had as members of the 
British empire.  They were to be treated not as aliens when in other states, 
but as fellow citizens.  No matter where Americans roamed, did business, 
or owned property within the United States, they would be afforded the 
same legal protections and advantages that the citizens of those states 
possessed. 
At a minimum, “privileges and immunities” signified the right to travel, 
residency, property, and equal commerce.  But “privileges and immunities” 
also encompassed much more: all of the freedoms and benefits a state 
granted to its people.  The natural rights to life, limb, liberty and property 
were abstractions; what counted was the actual enforcement of those rights 
through the institutions of government.  For that reason, Blackstone could 
say that the “rights and liberties” themselves were “defined by these several 
statutes.”294  They were either natural liberties not sacrificed upon entering 
society, or liberties provided by the state as substitutes for those rights.295 
C. The Relation of the Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizenship to Natural Rights 
The fact that both terms, “privileges” and “immunities,” were applied to 
all sorts of liberties belonging to the people, including natural rights like 
freedom of conscience, does raise a question about word usage.  Why 
 
293. RAMSAY, supra note 280, at 3. 
294. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *125.  
295. Id. 
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would the Framers employ “privilege” to describe a God-given liberty such 
as the right of free conscience, when to eighteenth-century speakers the 
word implied something granted by the government?  Several 
commentators recently have argued that the “Privileges and Immunities” 
referred to in Article IV and the Articles were entirely distinct from natural 
rights.  According to this view, privileges and immunities were “legal 
benefits granted to citizens or groups by official grace,” and thus 
“represented a very different juristic category from natural rights,”296 
which “were inherent in one’s humanity.”297  Whereas “privileges and 
immunities were . . . bestowed,”298 “[n]atural rights, to the extent their 
exercise did not harm others, were inalienable.”299  A 1765 pamphlet, 
written by Stephen Hopkins (the Rhode Island governor and a future signer 
of the Declaration) would seem to support this interpretation, as he 
concluded that “the British subjects in America, have equal rights with 
those in Britain; that they do not hold those rights as a privilege granted 
them, nor enjoy them as a grace and favor bestowed; but possess them as 
an inherent, indefeasible right . . . .”300  For this reason, it has been 
contended that the Framers deliberately did not include the words 
“liberties” or “rights” in Article IV.  In the debates over the Articles, 
Congress considered and rejected a draft, probably by John Dickinson, that 
would have provided: “The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth 
always have the same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and 
Advantages, in the other Colonies.”301  Congress also deliberately chose 
“privileges and immunities,” rather than “rights and privileges.”302  This 
occurred in 1776–77, a decade before the Philadelphia Convention, and no 
record was left to explain the choice. 
The argument that the “privileges and immunities” protected by Article 
IV did not encompass natural rights has serious flaws, starting with the 
 
296. Natelson, supra note 18, at 1166. 
297. Id. at 1168. 
298. Id. at 1174. 
299. Id. at 1166.  
300. STEPHEN HOPKINS, THE RIGHTS OF COLONIES EXAMINED 9 (Providence, William 
Goddard 1765).  Hopkins’ pamphlet was reprinted in London in 1766 under the title, THE 
GRIEVANCES OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES CANDIDLY EXAMINED (J. Almon 1766). 
301. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION (John Dickinson’s proposed 
draft) (July 12, 1776), art. VI, reprinted in 5 J. CONT. CONG. 1774–1789, at 546, 547 
(Worthington Chancey Ford et al. eds., 1904), quoted in Natelson, supra note 18, at 1168–69.  
For unknown reasons, Congress omitted the quoted provisions in the next draft of the Articles.  
See 5 J. CONT. CONG., supra, at 676 (Aug. 20, 1776) (This draft struck the comity proposals in 
the Dickinson draft entirely, probably because Congress was working on an alternative.); 9 J. 
CONT. CONG., supra, at 899 (Nov. 13, 1777) (adopting “privileges and immunities,” rather than 
“rights and privileges,” without explanation). 
302. See 9 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 301, at 888–89 (Nov. 11, 1777) (showing that “rights 
and privileges” appeared in alternative drafts of Articles).   
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absence of direct evidence to support it.  No one from the framing period 
has been quoted saying that Article IV did not protect any natural rights.  
As the various references above show, the terms “privileges” and 
“immunities” were used to signify the most important rights attached to 
citizenship.  They included representation in legislatures, equal protection 
of the laws, access to courts, trial by jury, freedom of press, and state 
protection of life, limb, and property.  Many of the privileges and 
immunities associated with British citizenship were considered as either 
natural rights themselves—for example, the equal application of law to 
all—or essential to the exercise of natural liberties—as with juries and 
habeas corpus.  However, privileges and immunities also could be more 
pedestrian, as when a state granted trading advantages to its citizens.  
Under Article IV, such a privilege would have to be extended to other 
Americans doing business within its borders. 
One answer to why the word “privileges” could be understood as 
encompassing natural rights was its traditional usage, derived from a past in 
which rights had been wrested from the crown and were tightly constrained 
by law.  Or it may have been used to reflect the reservation in Cato’s 
Letters, that liberties like free speech must be exercised “within the Bounds 
of Manners and Discretion.”303  The likeliest explanation, however, is that 
these were familiar terms used by eighteenth-century writers to depict all 
the advantages of being a citizen or subject.  In political literature, the 
words “rights” and “privileges” often had the same meaning, as in several 
examples given above from state constitutions and congressional 
resolutions.  As we have seen, a common application of these terms was to 
summarize colonists’ claims against the British, namely that Americans 
were entitled to the same legal protections and advantages as subjects 
residing in England.304 
The decisive question, then, is what Americans understood to be the 
rights of citizenship, rather than the precise labels that were used to 
describe them.  The status of citizen or subject was tied to the mythic social 
contract between the government and the people, in which individuals 
entered society in order to protect their personal liberties and property.  The 
Vermont Constitution of 1777 reflected this philosophy: “That government 
is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and 
security of the people, nation or community.305  [E]very member of society 
hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and 
 
303. 3 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 267, at 304. 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 200–09 and note 209 (providing examples of the use 
of “privileges” and “immunities” as summaries of rights demanded by Americans). 
305. VT. CONST. of 1777, art. VI. 
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property.”306  Above all, citizens were entitled to the rule of law and its 
established processes.  The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was one of 
several providing that “no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, 
or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the 
protection of the law.”307  Government officials were charged with 
assuring the protection of their people.  The Georgia Constitution in 1777 
required the governor to take an oath promising to “use my utmost 
endeavors to protect the people thereof in the secure enjoyment of all their 
rights, franchises, and privileges.”308  Pennsylvania legislators likewise 
were obliged to swear not to “lessen or abridge” the “rights and privileges” 
of the people, “as declared in the constitution of this state.”309 
Being a citizen or subject thus entailed that the government was 
obligated to respect and protect that person’s rights.  The close association 
between the protections that went with citizenship, and the liberties 
ultimately being protected, may be the reason why writings of the period 
usually did not distinguish between the two.  This is why Blackstone could 
write that “rights and liberties”310 “consist in a number of private 
immunities,” as defined “by these several statutes.”311  Both legal and 
popular writers used the terms as comprehensive depictions of the rights of 
subjects or citizens.  For legal documents, terms like “privileges and 
immunities” were boilerplate expressions signifying that everything was 
included, as in the various charters and grants already discussed. 
State constitutions also did not always distinguish carefully between the 
natural and positive sources of rights and privileges.  Georgia provided in 
its 1777 constitution that “Americans, as freemen,” were asserting “the 
rights and Privileges they are entitled to by the laws of nature and reason,” 
the last three words of which could have been lifted straight from 
Blackstone.312  Drafters also knew how to qualify such terms with limiting 
 
306. Id. at art. IX. 
307. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XII; see N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. XV (1784).  For 
provisions similar to the Massachusetts constitution, see MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXI (“That no 
freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or 
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but 
by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.”); N.C. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. XII (1776) 
(“That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold liberties or 
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or 
property, but by the law of the land.”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLI (substantially same as 
Maryland Constitution, supra). 
308. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XXIV. 
309. PA. CONST. of 1776, “Plan or Frame of Government,” § 10.   
310. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *125. 
311. Id. 
312. GA. CONST. of 1777, pmbl.; see also N.H. CONST. of 1776, pmbl. (noting that the British 
had deprived Americans “of our natural and constitutional rights and privileges”).  On 
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words, as in Vermont’s 1786 constitution: “The declaration of the political 
rights and privileges of the inhabitants of this State, is hereby declared to be 
a part of the Constitution of this Commonwealth; and ought not to be 
violated on any pretence whatsoever.”313  Article IV’s coverage was 
limited only by its requirement that the rights be ones pertaining to state 
citizenship. 
The popular understanding of “privileges and immunities” in relation to 
subjects or citizens paralleled these technical usages, as a reference to the 
totality of advantages a person gained from that status.  In an English novel 
published in 1771, the author posed a character imploring another to “at 
least allow, that by the union the Scots were admitted to all the privileges 
and immunities of English subjects; by which means multitudes of them 
were provided for in the army and navy, and got fortunes in different parts 
of England, and its dominions.”314  Catherine Macaulay, the eighteenth-
century English historian and supporter of radical causes, wrote in a 1775 
tract about the plight of “[t]he poor Canadians,” who “instead of being put 
in possession of all the privileges and immunities of English subjects,” had 
found their “civil and religious rights” subject to the “indulgence” of the 
crown, leaving the colonists “in a more abject state of slavery than when 
they were under the French government.”315 
To counter the many examples of privileges and immunities used to 
depict natural rights, one commentator has argued that a shift in definitions 
was underway, starting during the agitation of the 1760s that eventually led 
to the Revolution, whereby “liberty” began to be “applied exclusively to 
natural liberty,” while “right” could either mean a natural right or legal 
privilege.316  “After Independence, people routinely distinguished between 
rights and privileges,” he claimed.317  Aside from the Hopkins quotation 
above, which predated the Revolution, the only example offered of such a 
distinction was from an 1805 book by Mercy Warren, in which she wrote 
that the “principles” of the American Revolution were grounded in the 
“rights of men, the privileges of Englishmen, and the claim of 
Americans.”318  Neither of these writers was addressing whether the 
“Privileges and Immunities of Citizens” could include rights that ultimately 
 
Blackstone’s very similar phrasing, see supra text accompanying note 210. 
313. VT. CONST. of 1786, § 39 (emphasis added). 
314. TOBIAS SMOLLETT, THE EXPEDITION OF HUMPHRY CLINKER 104 (London, Harrison & 
Co. 1771). 
315. CATHARINE MACAULAY, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND 
IRELAND, ON THE PRESENT IMPORTANT CRISIS OF AFFAIRS 16 (Bath, R. Cruttwell 1775). 
316. Natelson, supra note 18, at 1141–42. 
317. Id. at 1142. 
318. Id. at 1142 n.129 (quoting MERCY OTIS WARREN, 2 HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS 
AND TERMINATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 306 (Boston, Manning & Loring 1805)). 
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were based on natural law.  Rather, as will be explained more fully, they 
were making broad claims about the validity under natural law of the 
colonists’ demands or the Revolution itself.319 
As the earlier discussion showed, there were many instances during and 
after the Revolution in which Americans referred to natural rights as 
privileges.  When the Continental Congress asserted that Americans were 
fighting for “our dearest privileges,” for example, they had in mind the 
entire constellation of rights owed to British citizens, including property 
rights.320 
The rights associated with property were universally referred to in the 
Anglo-American world as natural liberties, “sacred and inviolable,” as 
Blackstone said, not benefits given by grace.321  The title to all real 
property in America might theoretically run backward to the king, as in 
England, but that did not make ownership dependent on the continued 
indulgence of the crown (especially not ownership of personal property).322  
“For it is a part of the liberties of England . . . that the King may not enter 
upon or seise any man’s possessions upon bare surmises without the 
intervention of a jury.”323  If Article IV did not protect property rights, it 
would mean that the rights of American citizens venturing into sister states 
would be inferior to aliens under British law, who at least were allowed to 
own personal property while on British soil.  But the clause must have 
extended to property rights of all types—as courts consistently have 
held324—for otherwise an American could be treated as an alien while 
venturing into a sister state. 
Property rights illustrate why Americans and Britons could refer to them 
both as privileges of citizenship guaranteed by the state, as well as natural 
liberties.  The underlying right was based on natural law; the privilege was 
the entitlement of citizens or subjects to own property in the state and have 
it be protected by the government.  Tench Coxe, a well-known public 
 
319. See infra text accompanying notes 339–43. 
320. Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Canada, supra note 199, at 85. 
321. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *135. 
322. Natelson has contended that “[u]nder English law, tenure of land was a privilege because 
all land nominally belonged to the Crown.”  Natelson, supra note 18, at 1165.  None of the 
sources he cites terms property ownership a “privilege.”  As explained in the next paragraph of 
text, the privilege was the right of citizens to own property in the state, but the underlying right to 
ownership of the property was a natural right of persons.  See infra text accompanying note 325. 
323. 2 THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE, OF 
THE ENGLISH LAW, IN THEORY AND PRACTICE; DEFINING AND INTERPRETING THE TERMS OR 
WORDS OF ART (London, Giles Jacob & T.E. Tomlins eds., Strahan 1797) (unpaginated, entry for 
“Inquest”). 
324. See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. 1709, 1716 (2013) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 
6 F.Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)) (noting that the right “to ‘take, hold and dispose of 
property, either real or personal,’ has long been seen as one of the privileges of citizenship”). 
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figure and author on political economy who had been a member of the 
Continental Congress and served in the Washington administration, wrote 
in 1795 that Pennsylvania granted “foreigners” “[a] privilege, almost 
peculiar to this state,” namely “that of buying and holding lands and houses 
within this commonwealth, without relinquishing their allegiance to the 
country in which they were born.”325  The privilege, in other words, was 
the right to purchase and possess property in the state, which usually was 
reserved for citizens.  Once the property was owned by someone, that 
person had a natural right to keep it and the government was obligated to 
protect that ownership as a privilege of citizenship. 
The right of conscience was also recognized in many of the first state 
constitutions as a natural liberty enjoyed by all people,326 and it would be 
surprising to find anyone saying that this freedom could be denied to 
visitors.  In order to “guard against that spiritual oppression and intolerance 
wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests and princes 
have scourged mankind,” New York’s constitution asserted “that the free 
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without 
discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this 
State, to all mankind.”327  Georgia’s constitution provided: “All persons 
 
325. TENCH COXE, A VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 67 (Dublin, P. Wogan et al. 
1795); see Curtis, Historical, supra note 187, at 1098–104 (noting the synonymous use of 
“rights,” “privileges,” and “immunities” during the ratification debates and in the First Congress); 
see also Virginia Resolves on the Stamp Act, Virginia House of Burgesses (May 29, 1765), 
reprinted in 10 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1761–1765, at 358, 360 
(John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1907) [hereinafter Virginia Resolves on the Stamp Act] (claiming 
that Virginia colonists were entitled to “all the Liberties, Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities, 
that have at any Time been held, enjoyed, and possessed, by the people of Great Britain,” as 
declared by their charters with James I). 
326. See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2 (“That all men have a natural and 
unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and 
understandings.”); GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 3 (“That all men 
have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their 
own consciences.”); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII  (“[I]t is the duty of every man to worship 
God in such manner as he thinks most acceptable to him.”); N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. V (1784) 
(“Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the dictates of 
his own conscience, and reason.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, 
art. XIV (same as Georgia); PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. II (1776) (same as Georgia); PA. 
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3 (“That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship 
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.”); VT. DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, ch. 1, art. III (1777) (“That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship 
Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding . . . and that 
no authority can . . . interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free 
exercise of religious worship.”); VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch. 1, art. III (1786) 
(substantially the same as ch. 1 art. III of 1777 constitution); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. XVI 
(1776) (“[A]ll men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
conscience . . . .”). 
327. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII (emphasis added). 
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whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion.”328  These were 
typical of state conscience clauses.329  Other rights delineated as 
inalienable by state constitutions almost always were described as 
belonging to every person.330 
As with property, the abstract natural right of conscience331 was 
implemented through constitutions and charters.  A majority of early state 
constitutions went beyond declaring freedom of conscience as a principle, 
to expressly protecting the right of all individuals to “worship” or to the 
“free exercise of religion.”332  Some forbade or regulated specific practices: 
official establishments or compelled support of religion,333 forcing people 
 
328. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI (emphasis added). 
329. See supra note 326 (providing examples of conscience clauses in state constitutions). 
330. See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 1 (“[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are 
equal, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate public emoluments or 
privileges from the community but in consideration of public services.”); id. at art. XII, § 2 
(stating that the people “have at all times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or 
abolish their government, in such manner as they may think proper”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 
1, art. I (“All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable 
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and 
obtaining their safety and happiness.”); N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. II (1784) (“All men have 
certain natural, essential, and inherent rights, among which are—the enjoying and defending life 
and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property—and, in a word, of seeking and 
obtaining happiness.”); PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. I (1776) (“That all men are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst 
which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”); id. at art. V (“And that the 
community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish 
government in such manner as shall be by that community judged most conducive to the public 
weal.”); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 1 (substantially same as Articles 1 and 5 of 1776 
declaration of rights); VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch. 1, art. I (1777) (“That all men are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst 
which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”); id. at art. VI (“[T]hat the 
community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right, to reform, alter or abolish 
government, in such manner as shall be, by that community, judged most conducive to the public 
weal.”); VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch. 1, art. I (1786) (substantially the same as art. I of 
1777 constitution); id. at art. III (substantially the same as art. III of 1777 constitution); id. at art. 
VII (same as art. VI of 1777 constitution); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 1 (1776) (“[A]ll men are by 
nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter 
into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity, namely, the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing 
and obtaining happiness and safety.”); id. at § 3 (“[W]hen any government shall be found 
inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, 
inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged 
most conducive to the public weal.”). 
331. See supra note 326 (providing examples of conscience clauses in state constitutions). 
332. See supra note 326 (providing examples of protections for religious exercise in state 
constitutions). 
333. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIX; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX; N.C. CONST. 
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to attend religious services outside their faith,334 requiring religious tests to 
hold public office,335 or otherwise depriving a person of civil rights on 
account of religious belief.336  The Constitution likewise barred religious 
tests for federal offices and specified that affirmations could be given 
instead of oaths, the latter being offensive to some religions.337  Every one 
of these items reflected a specific history of religious discrimination and of 
hard-fought privileges established to overcome such intolerance.  The 
delineated privileges were what really counted, not the abstract natural 
rights they protected.  Privileges were specific undertakings by the state, 
which often were commitments to act in ways that would safeguard or 
at least not interfere with the realization of natural rights.  They were 
not uniform across the country, as the varying state provisions attest. 
American thinking about the nature of government underwent profound 
change in the course of the Revolution, but not in ways that would affect 
the meaning of Article IV.  The break from England did not greatly alter 
the substance of individual rights that Americans claimed they were owed 
by their governments or even the means for their protection.  As earlier 
described, on both sides of the Atlantic the rights to life, limb, liberty, and 
 
of 1776, art. XXXII; PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. II (1776) (providing examples of 
constitutional limits on religious establishments).  South Carolina’s constitution designated the 
“Christian Protestant religion” as “the established religion of this State,” but provided that all 
other denominations “shall enjoy equal religious and civil privileges.”  S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. 
XXXVIII.  Georgia provided that no one could be obliged to “support any teacher or teachers 
except those of their own profession.”  GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI; see also MD. CONST. of 
1776, art. XXXIII (enabling legislature to impose general tax “for the support of the Christian 
religion,” and stating that individuals could designate “any particular place of worship or 
minister” to receive their remittances, or they could specify that it be used “for the benefit of the 
poor”). 
334. See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 2 (1776); PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 
II (1776); VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch. 1, art. III (1777) (providing examples of 
constitutional limits on requiring religious practices). 
335. See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXV; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXII; PA. 
CONST., “Plan or Frame of Government,” § 10 (1776) (providing examples of bans on religious 
tests).  Georgia, however, required members of the state assembly to be Protestants.  GA. CONST. 
of 1777, art. VI. 
336. See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 3 (1776); PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 
II (1776); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV (allowing affirmations rather than oaths); N.J. 
CONST. of 1776, art. XIX; PA. CONST., “Plan or Frame of Government,” § 10 (1776) 
(“[R]eligious societies or bodies . . . for the advancement of religion or learning, or for other 
pious and charitable purposes, shall [enjoy] the privileges, immunities and estates which they 
were accustomed to enjoy. . . under the laws and former constitution . . . .”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, 
art. XXXVIII (allowing affirmations instead of oaths); VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch. 1, art. 
III (1777).  Some states forbade ministers from public office.  See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. 
XXXIX. 
337. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (prohibiting religious tests); id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (stating that 
the Senate “shall be on Oath or Affirmation” in impeachment trials); id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 7 
(requiring that the President take specified “Oath or Affirmation”); id. at art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring 
that Senators and Representatives give an “Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”). 
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property were thought to be founded on natural law, rather than being the 
products of social convention.338  However, Americans adopted the radical 
view that some—but not all—of these natural rights were inalienable, that 
is, not subject to legislative limitation. 
When the statements of Hopkins, Warren, and others in a similar vein 
are examined in context, they all assert that the British had broken their 
contract with Americans, which the British were obligated to honor as a 
matter of natural law.  John Adams posited that the king had “enter[ed] into 
a contract with his subjects, and stipulate[d] that they should enjoy all the 
rights and liberties of Englishmen forever, in consideration of their 
undertaking to clear the wilderness, propagate Christianity, pay a fifth part 
of ore, &c.”339  If the king abrogated “the contract of state,” he continued, 
the people “were released from their allegiance as soon as he deprived 
them of their liberties.”340  The colonists would then “recur to nature,” and 
reconstruct society by consent of the people.341 
Hopkins, in referring to the “inherent indefeasible right” of Americans, 
meant that they “and their ancestors, were free-born subjects, justly and 
naturally intituled to all the rights and advantages of the British 
constitution,” which he also termed its “privileges and advantages.”342  He 
could not understand why, given the many sources of revenue available to 
Parliament, it would choose “to abridge the privileges, and lessen the rights 
of the most loyal and dutiful subjects . . . who have long enjoyed, and not 
abused or forfeited their liberties.”343  Hopkins based his argument partly 
on natural law.  The Stamp Act and related excise laws, he explained, were 
regarded by colonists as “a manifest violation of their just and long enjoyed 
rights,” because “they who are taxed at pleasure by others, cannot possibly 
have any property, can have nothing to be called their own; they who have 
no property can have no freedom, but are indeed reduced to the most abject 
slavery.”344  This was precisely the point of the famous Massachusetts 
Circular Letter of 1768, in which the House of Representatives of the 
colony asserted “an essential, unalterable right, in nature, engrafted into the 
British constitution, as a fundamental law, and ever held sacred and 
 
338. See supra text accompanying notes 211, 214–15, 306, and notes 307, 330; see also infra 
text accompanying note 367 (providing examples of recognizing natural rights to life, liberty and 
property). 
339. John Adams, Novanglus, or A History of the Dispute with America (VIII), BOSTON 
GAZETTE, Mar. 6, 1775, reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 121, 126 (Charles Francis 
Adams, ed., Boston, Little & Brown Co. 1851). 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. HOPKINS, supra note 300, at 9. 
343. Id. at 22. 
344. Id. at 31. 
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irrevocable by the subjects within the realm, that what a man has honestly 
acquired is absolutely his own.”345 
In these statements, the natural right of property was linked with a 
privilege owed to all British citizens: representation in the body that taxed 
them.  “The position, that taxation and representation are inseparable, is 
founded on the immutable laws of nature,” the Massachusetts legislature 
wrote in a 1768 letter to the British Chancellor.346  Whatever its ultimate 
justification, the principle that a person could not be taxed without consent 
was firmly rooted in the history of successful parliamentary protests against 
the king’s efforts to extract taxes and other revenue impositions by his own 
authority.  David Hume, in his history of England, described the attempts 
by Charles I to raise funds “without consent of parliament, and even 
increasing them at pleasure,” as “such an incongruity in a free constitution, 
where the people, by their fundamental privileges, cannot be taxed but by 
their own consent,” that it “could no longer be endured by these jealous 
patrons of liberty.”347  The result was the Petition of Right, in which 
Charles I agreed to Parliament’s demand not to compel “any Guift, Loane, 
Benevolence, Tax, or such like Charge, without comon consent by Acte of 
Parliament.”348  Parliament grounded its claims on “their Rights and 
Liberties according to the Lawes and Statutes of this Realme.”349  
Blackstone noted that a subsequent statute enacted under William and 
Mary strengthened Parliament’s claim by providing that it was “illegal” for 
the crown to impose levies for money “by pretence of prerogative, without 
grant of parliament.”350 
 Essayists and public councils throughout America proclaimed that there 
were “unalienable rights,” over which “the supreme power hath no 
controul”—as a county convention of delegates considering a proposed 
Massachusetts constitution declared in 1778.351  State constitutions 
likewise delineated some, but not all natural rights as inalienable.  “Among 
the natural rights,” the New Hampshire bill of rights declared in 1784, 
 
345. Massachusetts Circular Letter (Feb. 11, 1768), in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 
66, 67 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 1948) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY]. 
346. Letter from Mass. House of Representatives to Earl of Camden, Lord High-Chancellor of 
Great-Britain (Jan. 29, 1768), PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 14, 1768, at 2.   
347. 5 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR 
TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 392 (London, T. Cadell 1789). 
348. 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 232, at 24.  
349. Id. 
350. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *136. 
351. RESULT OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES HOLDEN AT IPSWICH IN THE COUNTY OF 
ESSEX 10 (Newbury-Port, Mass., John Mycall 1778) [hereinafter ESSEX RESULT] (The Essex 
Result, drafted by Theophilus Parsons, later the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, was the resolution 
of delegates from Essex County, Massachusetts, at a 1778 county convention to consider a 
proposed state constitution.). 
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“some are in their very nature unalienable, because no equivalent can be 
given or received for them.  Of this kind are the Rights of Conscience.”352  
In making these claims, Americans recognized the difference between 
entitlements based on legal rights—such as those contained in charters and 
statutes—and natural rights, which existed irrespective of positive 
enactments.  In a 1775 essay, John Adams asked the question: “How, then, 
do we New Englandmen derive our laws?”  Answering himself, Adams 
contended that colonial laws came “not from parliament, not from common 
law, but from the law of nature, and the compact made with the king in our 
charters.”353 
These references to natural law invoked highly abstract principles—the 
rights of consent to legislation and to property.  When it came to specific 
grievances, however, what Adams and others demanded was nothing other 
than the legal rights they traditionally had as British subjects.  This is why 
“rights and liberties,” or similar expressions, were used by Americans as 
summations of their claims against the British.  Adams wrote that “[t]he 
patriots of this province desire nothing new; they wish only to keep their 
old privileges.”354  The Connecticut assembly resolved in 1764 that 
Americans had “a Right, to the general and essential Privileges of the 
British Constitution, as well as the rest of their Fellow-Subjects,” and with 
regard to the colony of Connecticut in particular, to the “general Privileges 
and Immunities . . . granted and declared” in its charter.355  The Stamp Act, 
regarded by Americans as an internal tax imposed without the consent of 
the colonies, would “take way Part of our Antient Priviledges,” wrote 
Thomas Fitch, Connecticut’s elected governor.356  The New York 
Assembly pled to George III in 1775 that “we wish only to enjoy the rights 
of Englishmen, and to have that share of liberty, and those privileges 
secured to us, which we are entitled to upon the principles of our free and 
happy Constitution.”357  Being treated as a British subject meant receiving 
all the protections and advantages of English law, regardless of its source. 
All of the liberties of the British people were protected by statute or 
charter, and hence were concessions of the King, theoretically subject to 
modification.  “The famous English Magna Charta is but an act of 
 
352. N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS., art. IV (1784). 
353. Adams, supra note 339, at 122. 
354. Id. at 131. 
355. Reasons Why, supra note 241, at 655. 
356. Letter from Thomas Fitch to Richard Jackson (Dec. 7, 1764), in 2 THE FITCH PAPERS: 
CORRESPONDENCE AND DOCUMENTS 303, 304 (Conn. Historical Soc’y ed. 1920). 
357. Petition of New York General Assembly to George III (March 25, 1775), PA. GAZETTE, 
Apr. 26, 1775, at 2; see also Virginia Resolves on the Stamp Act, supra note 325, at 360 (stating 
that colonists were entitled to “all the Liberties, Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities, that have 
at any Time been held, enjoyed, and possessed, by the people of Great Britain”). 
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parliament,” Roger Sherman pointed out in an essay during the ratification 
debates of 1787, “which every subsequent parliament has had just as much 
constitutional power to repeal and annul, as the parliament which made it 
had to pass it at first.”358  Nevertheless, it was these statutes that defined 
the “private immunities”359 of Britons; they embodied the “residuum of 
natural liberty” not sacrificed by individuals entering society.360  
Blackstone stated that the political or civil liberties “of a member of 
society” were “no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws 
(and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of 
the publick.”361  It was unlikely in the extreme that these laws would be 
repudiated, or that charters would be repealed.  They were the law of the 
land, and Americans were demanding that the crown and Parliament 
respect them. 
Long after the Constitution went in effect, American courts began to 
distinguish between “constitutional rights,” and mere “privileges” granted 
by the government—the difference between what the government must 
grant and what it may bestow at discretion.362  In American law, that 
distinction was understandable as courts recognized that the Constitution 
was a freestanding basis for legal claims, dependent on no statute for its 
authority.  British constitutionalism, as explained, did not distinguish the 
two when it came to determining a person’s rights—all rights were based 
on statute or common law.  Americans thus needed to make a 
determination unnecessary in British law; whether a claim was valid as a 
matter of constitutional right, as opposed to being based on statutory or 
common law—a “privilege” in the sense that it was revocable. 
The right-privilege distinction would cause enough grief for later 
generations, but it did not befoul Article IV.  The clause was not intended 
to distinguish between constitutionally-mandated rights—which would 
include natural rights—and benefits given to citizens by the grace of the 
state.  Rather, its purpose was to assure that visitors from other American 
states would be treated like local citizens, not as aliens.  And those citizens 
 
358. Roger Sherman, A Countryman (II), NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 219. 
359. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *125. 
360. Id. 
361. Id. at *121.  Blackstone followed conventional social contract theory: “[b]ut every man, 
when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a 
purchase.”  Id.; see also N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. III (1784) (“When men enter into a state of 
society, they surrender up some of their natural rights to that society, in order in insure the 
protection of others; and, without such an equivalent, the surrender is void.”). 
362. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (providing background on the right-privilege 
distinction in early American cases before arguing that the dichotomy is not viable in light of 
subsequent developments in law and society). 
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lived under state constitutions that protected their rights, some of which 
were grounded ultimately in natural law. 
In the context of Article IV, it made no difference whether a “privilege 
and immunity” was a universal right of humankind, or one only for the 
citizens of a state.  If the right at issue was based on natural law, a state 
presumably would extend it to the visitor as a human right—the same 
treatment given to state citizens.  This was reflected in the wording of state 
constitutional provisions protecting rights that were identified as natural 
and inalienable.  As we have seen with regard to rights of conscience, these 
instruments declared the right to be inherent in “mankind,” belonging to 
“all persons,” or similar words denoting universality of coverage.363  And 
since the privileges and immunities of citizenship included access to courts 
and entitlement to equal treatment under the law, Article IV would require 
that any natural right that a state recognized for its own citizens be 
extended to all other Americans.  In this manner, Article IV protected the 
property and personal liberties of nonresident traders or investors by giving 
them the same status as state citizens before the law. 
To read Article IV as not protecting natural rights would mean that 
states were required to extend mere government-created benefits to non-
citizens, but not the most precious of human rights.  This is an implausible 
interpretation considering the demands for rights of citizenship in myriad 
revolutionary documents.  Americans had claimed that all of their 
grievances would be satisfied if they were treated the same as other British 
subjects.  Independence required a reformulation of the basis of their 
political system, but Americans certainly did not want to diminish the 
rights they had possessed as Britons.  Those rights included residing, 
owning property, or doing business in any part of the kingdom.  To lose 
these rights would make Americans aliens anywhere outside their own 
states.  Against this background, it is highly doubtful that a constitutional 
measure meant to assure the equivalence of rights for visiting Americans 
excluded the most fundamental of liberties.  It is even less probable that 
such an interpretation could have prevailed without anyone protesting. 
Omitting natural rights from the ambit of privileges and immunities also 
would have produced difficult interpretive problems.  As noted above, 
natural rights were divided into two types, “the alienable and unalienable 
rights of mankind.”364  There was broad agreement among Americans at 
the time about the existence of inalienable rights and their origin in natural 
 
363. See supra text accompanying notes 211, 214–15, 306, and notes 307, 330; see also infra 
text accompanying note 367 (examples recognizing natural rights of all persons to life, liberty and 
property). 
364. ESSEX RESULT, supra note 351, at 10. 
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law.365  However, only a few rights were by consensus deemed natural and 
inalienable: equality of all persons, conscience, property, and the freedom 
to reform, alter, or abolish the government.366  With the exception of 
liberty of conscience, the rights usually cited as inalienable corresponded to 
the absolute rights detailed by Blackstone.  The Declaration of 
Independence asserted that “all men are created equal”—which Blackstone 
did as well—and identified “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” as 
“among” the “unalienable rights” that were “endowed by their Creator.”367  
State bills of rights, where they existed, were similar in identifying 
inalienable rights, with several adding a provision that the people had the 
right “to reform, alter, or abolish, government.”368 
As to other rights, there was much less concurrence about whether they 
were based on natural law, common law, or some other conventional 
source.  Gordon Wood has written that the dramatic events of the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century—the return of the American colonies to a 
state of nature followed by adoption of written constitutions by thirteen 
sovereignties—created “a peculiar confusion in the American mind about 
the nature of law.”369  Constitutions, written instruments with prescriptive 
force, were in one way decidedly modern—they had the force of law “as 
the command of a sovereign will”—while at the same time they were 
intended to establish natural justice, an ancient concept rooted in religious 
precepts.370  Similarly, the common law was an exercise in gradually 
recognizing, over the course of generations, the commands of natural law.  
Jurists would sometimes use the terms interchangeably and also equated 
natural law with the law of nations. 
The “alienable” natural rights were ones that could be surrendered 
“[W]HEN THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE REQUIRES IT,” according to a typical 
political resolution.371  Public interest could trump all but the most “sacred 
 
365. See R. H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights 
in the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401, 403 (2007) (“During the early years of our 
Republic, the existence and relevance of natural law was taken for granted by virtually all serious 
writers about the law.”). 
366. See supra text accompanying notes 326–29, 352, and notes 326, 330 (examples of natural 
and inalienable rights). 
367. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 19, at *48 (“[A]ll the members of society are naturally equal . . . .”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 211, 214–15. 
368. PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. V (1776).  For other examples of state-declared 
inalienable rights, see supra text accompanying notes 326–29, 352, and notes 326, 330.  
369. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 292 
(1969). 
370. Id. 
371. ESSEX RESULT, supra note 351, at 14. 
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and irrevocable” of rights, the Massachusetts Circular Letter contended.372  
State constitutions did not differentiate between natural and positive rights, 
except in declaring that inalienable rights were natural or inherent.  They 
also varied greatly in the rights they covered.  Likewise, the federal Bill of 
Rights likewise did not identify rights by their pedigree.  Following the 
pattern of state constitutions, some of its protections were labeled 
“rights”—for example: “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.”373  Or no descriptor was used, as in the 
First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”374  
Some of the protected rights were often regarded as natural and inalienable, 
such as free exercise of religion and liberty of press.  Most of its 
guarantees, however, were ones commonly referred to as privileges, even 
though the Bill of Rights labeled them “rights.”  Examples include the 
“right” of trial by jury in civil and criminal cases, as well as some of the 
procedural protections for criminal suspects such as “the right to a speedy 
and public trial.”375  When debating the proposed bill of rights in Congress, 
Madison commented that its purpose was “securing the rights and 
privileges of the people of America.”376 
If the coverage of Article IV turned on whether a right was natural or 
conventional, that determination would have to be made in every case.  But 
there was no authoritative source to answer this question.377  State judicial 
decisions would provide little guidance since the distinction was irrelevant 
to legal disputes.  People had opinions about which rights were natural, but 
they were expressed in different contexts than discerning the privileges and 
immunities protected by Article IV.  For practical purposes, such as 
drafting a bill of rights, there was no point in labeling a right to be natural 
or not, so long as it was recognized as a constitutional guarantee. 
Consider liberty of press, which some writers referred to as a natural 
right, while others called it a privilege, and some even used both words.  
State constitutions equivocated on its status.  Some referred to press rights 
generally, as when Georgia declared in 1789 that “[f]reedom of the press . . 
 
372. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 345, at 66. 
373. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
374. Id. at amend. I. 
375. See id. at amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed.”); id. at amend. VII (stating that “the right of trial by jury shall be preserved” in 
common law cases for more than twenty dollars). 
376. Madison, supra note 256, at 738 (Aug. 15, 1789). 
377. See Helmholz, supra note 365, at 413 (finding that a “definitive list” of natural rights did 
not exist, “neither in the cases nor in the treatises”). 
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. shall remain inviolate.”378  Others stated that “the people” were entitled to 
liberty of press, which could imply that it was reserved for members in the 
polity.379  Only Delaware, in its 1792 constitution, specifically limited 
press rights to state citizens.380  The different wording for the press 
provisions compared to those for expressly declared inalienable rights 
could have stemmed from uncertainty over their status as natural rights.  
Regardless, ascertaining whether these press protections were meant to 
secure natural rights or conventional privileges would be challenging.  It is 
hard to imagine that the coverage of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
was meant to depend on such determinations.  Writers frequently published 
books and pamphlets outside their home states, and articles were reprinted 
in newspapers up and down the coast as well as across the sea.  Later 
generations of Americans worried about the writings of outside agitators, 
notably in the Southern resistance to Northerners mailing abolitionist 
literature to their states.381  But this was not an issue in the 1780s.  In any 
event, Southern states would not allow abolitionist writings by their own 
citizens.382 
Another example of the difficulty in distinguishing natural and 
conventional rights is the right to bear arms.  Blackstone termed it an 
auxiliary right, “a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural 
right of resistance and self-preservation.”383  The English Bill of Rights 
provided that “the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their 
Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law.384  Only four 
states provided constitutional guarantees for the right to bear arms, and 
 
378. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 3; see also MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXVIII (“[L]iberty 
of the press ought to be inviolably preserved.”); N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. XXII (1784) (“Liberty 
of the Press is essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought, therefore, to be inviolably 
preserved.”); N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XV (1776) (“[F]reedom of the press is one of 
the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought never to be restrained.”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, 
art. XLIII (“[L]iberty of the press be inviolably preserved.”); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 12 (1776), 
(“[F]reedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but 
by despotick governments.”). 
379. See PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XII (1776) (“[T]he people have a right to freedom 
of speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press 
ought not to be restrained.”); VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch. 1, art. XIV (1777) (“[T]he 
people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments.”). 
380. See DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 5 (“The press shall be free to every citizen who 
undertakes to examine the official conduct of men acting in a public capacity; and any citizen 
may print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”). 
381. See Jay, supra note 262, at 805–07. 
382. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: 
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 158 (2000) (describing Southern 
statutes prohibiting publication of abolitionist papers). 
383. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *139. 
384. ENG. BILL OF RIGHTS, 1 W. & M., c.2, § 7 (1689). 
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these mainly concerned militia service, and none said the right was 
inalienable. 385  Some provisions for bearing arms actually were obligations 
of citizenship.  New York’s Constitution of 1777 made it the “duty” of 
every man “to be prepared and willing to defend” the state, and then 
declared that the militia must be “armed and disciplined, and in readiness 
for service.”386 
Should the liberty to possess and use firearms be characterized as a 
privilege, inasmuch as it was “a public allowance” and regulable by law?  
Or was it a natural right based on protecting the right to defend oneself?  
Answering that question would be unavoidable if “privileges” under 
Article IV could not be natural rights.  Such an exercise, however, would 
miss the point of how privileges and immunities functioned in early 
American society.  In the abstract, people had the natural right of self-
defense.  Instruments like the English or American bills of rights enforced 
the right by recognizing the privilege of bearing arms.  Thus, the right to 
bear arms was both rooted in natural law and considered a privilege—if not 
a duty—of citizenship. 
CONCLUSION 
The “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens” most likely was understood 
at the time of its creation and ratification as a shorthand expression for all 
the rights a state afforded its citizens, regardless of their origin.  With 
independence, Americans lost all the rights they had as British subjects, 
which included the privileges of residing, owning property, or engaging in 
trade most anywhere in the empire.  As separate sovereigns after the 
Revolution, the individual states could and did discriminate against citizens 
of other states in ways that would have been impermissible when 
Americans were British subjects.  Article IV was intended to forbid such 
discriminations, as part of a larger plan to restore the privileges Americans 
 
385. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and to bear 
arms for the common defence.”); N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (1776) (“That the 
people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State; and, as standing armies, in time of 
peace.”); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21 (“That the right of citizens to bear arms, in defence of 
themselves and the State, shall not be questioned.”); VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch. 1, art. XV 
(1777) (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”); 
VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 1, art. XVIII (same). 
 386. N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XL.  The full provision reads:  
And whereas it is of the utmost importance to the safety of every State that it should 
always be in a condition of defence; and it is the duty of every man who enjoys the 
protection of society to be prepared and willing to defend it; . . . the militia of this 
State, at all times hereafter, as well in peace as in war, shall be armed and disciplined, 
and in readiness for service.   
Id.; see also VA. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 13 (1776) (“That a well regulated militia, composed of the 
body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state.”).  
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had before Independence.  It did not break new ground—the Articles of 
Confederation did the same, albeit with more verbiage.  But whereas the 
Articles provided no means to enforce its comity clause, the Constitution 
enabled the creation of a federal judiciary with power to do so.  
This explanation of the clause fits the historical record perfectly.  It 
avoids the messy interpretive tangles that would follow if natural rights 
were excluded from Article IV’s protection, as some scholars have argued.  
And it escapes the subjectivity involved in deciding whether a right is 
sufficiently “fundamental” in the sense of being “basic to the maintenance 
or well-being of the Union.”387  Moreover, it elucidates why the Framers 
did not include the word “rights” in the clause.  Doing so would have been 
redundant in this context.  (One of the dictionary definitions of “right” in 
the eighteenth century was “privilege”388).  The “Privileges and 
Immunities” of citizenship were not inalienable natural rights per se.  
Rather, they encompassed every right and advantage that a state bestowed 
on its citizens, including those essential to protecting natural rights. 
 
387. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Com’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978). 
388. See JAMES BARCLAY, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON A NEW 
PLAN (unpaginated, entry for “right”) (London, J. Rivington & Sons 1782) (including “privilege” 
as one definition of “right”); JOHNSON, supra note 96 (unpaginated, entry for “right”) (including 
“immunity” and “privilege” as alternative meanings for “right”).  
